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International Law in Mexican Courts
Jorge Cicero'
ABSTRACT

Recognizing the increasing importance of international
law in Mexico, this Article addressesthe actual and potential
uses of international law in Mexican courts. The Article
reviews the ways in which the Mexican system already
ensures the judicial consideration of international
undertakings, as well as areas of possible improvements.

The Article first considers the role and status of international
law in the Mexican legal order, including the domestic status
of internatonl treaties and agreements, as well as the
interaction between national and internationalnorms. Next,
the Article focuses on ways to ensure the consideration of
international legal questions by Mexico's high courts.
Because Mexican courts have yet to develop a tradition of
considering international standards of interpretation, the
authorproposes suggestionsfor establishing a jurisprudence
in harmony with internationalundertakings. 7he Article then
surveys the relationship between the Judiciary and the
Executive in questions of international law by reviewing
traditional as well as emerging international issues. The
Article also considers standing to raise questions of
internationallaw before Mexican courts and suggests means
of assistingMexicanjudges in the applicationof international
law. The Article concludes that Mexican law provides
plentiful means for making international undertakings
effective before domestic courts and tribunals of justice, but
encourages further awareness and application of these
means.
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University. Member,
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I. INTRODUCTION

In a global community where images, persons, goods, capital,
services, ideas, and even crime flow swiftly, international law
increasingly touches the national administration of justice.
Strikingly, no matter how clearly different legal systems have
incorporated treaties and other international sources, the
domestic use of these international agreements is rarely realized
in practice. Whether or not the national order explicitly embraces
the domestic applicability of international norms, cultural factors
tend to outweigh the letter of the law. Yet there is little doubt
that the domestic law on a subject may significantly influence a
legal community's attitudes toward international law.
In Mexico, at least three sets of circumstances shed light on
why litigants and judges have yet to take full advantage of
international law. First, the specific purpose of certain Mexican
constitutional provisions is to deter the importation of intrusive
agreements and less protective international standards. These

provisions were adopted during a time of foreign intervention,
when domestic law provided not only superior, but, with few
exceptions, exclusive protection in matters of fundamental rights.
There are no similar restraints expressly deterring constitutional
amendments to withdraw or to restrict previously acquired
freedoms. The assumption is that national minimum standards
are always superior and that external threats to them should be
the chief, if not the exclusive, constitutional concern.
Treaties do not achieve supreme rank in Mexico merely
because of their ratification. The Mexican Constitution, unlike
the U.S. Constitution, expressly cautions that the principle of
supremacy applies only to treaties that conform to it.' Another
clause in the Mexican Constitution expressly proscribes the
conclusion of treaties restricting constitutional rights and

1.
Compare CONsrrrUcION PoLtIcA DE Los EsrADos UNIDOS MEX[CANOS
[hereinafter ME. CoNSr.] art. 133, amended by D.O., Jan. 18, 1934 (according
supreme status to "all treaties... which shall be made in accordance therewith
by [the Constitution]"), with U.S. CONsr. art. VI (according supreme status to "all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States").
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freedoms. 2

This prohibition was

introduced in

the

1856

Constitutional Congress with the following consideration:
[Elxperience shows [that] treaties concluded and discussed with
precipitation often produce serious alterations in the civil and
Great powers generally tend to
political rights of citizens ....
influence the business of weaker countries; alliances, protectorates
and interventions produce such results. Currently, one notes in
the French Empire this trend and we all know that, in the last
Congress of Paris, Louis Napoleon's Minister attempted to restrict
the freedom of press enjoyed in Belgium. Because of a treaty,
then, certain political rights or other liberties such as commerce,
movement, etc., may be lost.3

Implied in these clauses is the constitutional sanction, perhaps
even the constitutional status, of international treaties advancing
However, reading this
fundamental rights and freedoms. 4
implication into the Constitution requires an interpretive task
because the Constitution's meaning is not obvious.5 Given this
framework, skepticism about the domestic uses of international
instruments is not surprising.
rlypically, controversies about
treaties focus on unconstitutional treaty-based behavior, rather
than on constitutional covenants, treaties, and conventions.

2.
See MED. CoNSr. art. 15 ('The conclusion of treaties for the extradition
of political prisoners, or for [the extradition] of common offenders that have had
the condition of slaves in the country where they committed the offense: or of
agreements or treaties as a result of which the guarantees and rights established
by this Constitution for the citizen and men are altered, Is unauthorized")
(emphasts added). See also "Alc&reca Vda. de Garcia del C., Dolores," 19 S.J.F.
142 (Supreme Court's reaffirmation that "the conclusion of treaties altering
individual guarantees is unauthorized, for public order reasons").
3.
See Debates del Congreso Constltuyente de 1856, reprinted In 3
DERECHOS DEL PUEBLO MEXIcANo:

Maco

A TRAVES DE Sus CONSTTUCIONES 769-

70 (1967) [hereinafter DERECHOS DEL PUEBLO MEXICANO] (statement of Mr. Zarco).
4.
As one scholar eloquently explains:
There is no room for doubt that [Article 15's] prohibition ... use[s]
the term "to alter," in the sense or connotation of "disturbing,"
"perturbing," or "distressing" ... human rights, individual guarantees and
fundamental freedoms. But the rights of men and the citizen can be the
subject of changes, of alterations, always in a positive sense of expansive
progress in the sphere of individual liberties, both by means of additions
to ... the Political Constitution, with Its superior rank of Fundamental
Law, and by means of... ordinary legislation.
By the same token, by means of international bodies of law, that Is,
by conventions and treaties, new human rights can be added, as the
national Constitution ... spells out, in its catalog of individual liberties,
[only] basic and minimum principles or norms that shall always be a limit
or frontier to the action of the State, limits this can decrease to expand the
juridical statute of the human person.
... [F]or the validity of Mexico's accession to the UN Covenants on
Human Rights, the text in force of [Article 133] Is not an obstacle [either].
... [A]rtlcle 133's declaration that [the] Constitution, the laws that
stem therefrom, and ail Intemattonal treaties that are in accordance with
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Second, from a historical standpoint, the judicial application
of customary international law in Mexico is infrequent and
similarly related to external threats. 6 Several basic rules of
contemporary international law now enjoy the status of
constitutional principles governing Mexican foreign policy. 7 Even
so, these principles are oriented toward the President.8 The
constitutional control of his foreign policy corresponds to the
Senate, not the courts.9
Unlike standard domestic references to treaties and
conventions, in the Mexican order there are few express
references to "international law." Although such references appear
in respect to territorial waters and airspace,1 0 consular and

diplomatic assistance to courts, protection of nationals abroad, 1

it... shall be the Supreme Law of all the Union is not to be interpreted in
the sense that treaties must stem from, or have their express foundation
in the Constitution, as is the case of the laws passed by the Congress ....
For this reason and by contrarto sensu application of constitutional
[Alrticle 15's prohibition, the unfortunate 1934 addition to [Article 133 of
the words [treaties] That are in accordance with it (the Constitution)', must
be read as if it said 'that are not against it.'
Antonio Martnez Bdez, Correlactones entre la Constitucldn y los Pactos de las
Nactones Unkdas, in Los TRATAnos SOBRE DEREcHOS HUMANOS Y LA LEGIsiACI6N
MaxcANA 21, 25-27 (1986). For the sole example of expressly authorized treaties,
see ME.
CONST. art. 18, amended by D.O., Feb. 4. 1977 (authorizing the
conclusion of treaties on the execution of penal sentences abroad, provided the
prisoners' consent to each transfer).
5.
See Bdez, supra note 4.
6.
The case of Ferdinand Maximilian, the Hapsburg who attempted to
establish a hereditary monarchy in Mexico, is worth recalling. Some years after
the democratically enacted 1857 Constitution proclaimed the Republican form of
government, Maximilian "accepted" the Crown of Mexico and Napoleon m sent an
army of occupation. In 1867, a Mexican tribunal tried Maximilian and imposed
capital punishment for crimes against the law of nations and other felonies. See
Causa de Ma"Umillano de Hapsburgoque se ha tiullado Emperadorde Mdxico y de
sus lamados generales Miguel Miram6n y Tomds Mejfa sus cdmpllces en delitos
contra la Independenc a y in Seguridad de la Nact6n, el Orden y in Paz PCblica, el
Derecho de Gentes y las Garantf. s Individuales, in FERNANDO DEL PASO, NOnClAS
DEL hiPEo 569 (2d ed. 1989). See also Las
FUNDAMENrALES DE MEXIco 18081985, at 606, 670 (Felipe Ramirez ed., 13th ed. 1985) (discussing the Mexican
Constitution of 1857 and the Provisional Statute of the Mexican Empire).
7.
See Mx CONSr. art. 89, § X amended by D.O., May 11, 1988 (listing
the following principles: self-determination, nonintervention, peaceful dispute
settlement, proscription of the use or threat of force in international relations,
juridical equality of States, international cooperation for development, the

struggle for international peace and security).
8.
See kI.
9.
See id. art. 76 & § I, amended by D.O., May 11, 1988.
10.
See Id. arts. 27, 42, § X amended by D.O., May 11, 1988.
11.
See Ley Orgdnica del Servicio Exterior Mexicano, art. 2, § II, D.O., Jan.
4. 1994; "De la cooperaci6n procesal internacional," C.F.P.C. art. 548.
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and in statutes blocking foreign laws with extraterritorial reach, 1 2
there is little case law applicable to, let alone arising from,
international sources other than treaties.
In matters of
international law, the bench and bar, for good reason, cling to the
juridical certainty that rules recorded in treaties and statutes
provide, rather than attempting to apply more nebulous
"international law" concepts.
Finally, Mexican courts usually will not consider questions of
international law not timely raised by the parties. International
sources are not always precise, accessible, widely known, or even
translated into Spanish. When domestic law leads in principle to
the same result, the direct or indirect application of international

law appears inconsequential. Furthermore, if international bodies
are available, the interested parties may refrain from asserting the
relevant agreement before national courts in order to promptly
reach the international bodies.
Still, while some international sources and rules add little to
national law, others are increasingly crucial to domestic
adjudication. As for the prior exhaustion of domestic remedies, it
is true that sometimes it admits of waivers and exceptions. But it
is equally true that international jurisdictions cannot replace
national courts; they often rely on national courts, where the
cases may ultimately be tried.
Traditional case law consistently indicates that Mexican
courts are prone to interpret, consider, and apply, as appropriate,
duly concluded treaties and conventions. More importantly, the
Mexican legal system is undergoing unprecedented developments
that strikingly expand the avenues to give effect to international
undertakings, if necessary, by judicial means.
This Article discusses the actual and potential uses of
international law in Mexican courts, considering each topic
suggested by the International Law Association (hereinafter ILA)
Helsinki Conference. 13 While reviewing how the Mexican system
already ensures judicial consideration of international
undertakings, this Article also identifies several areas susceptible
to possible refinements. Part II examines the current domestic
status of international law in Mexico. Part III discusses the
means of ensuring that Mexico's high courts hear questions of
international law.
In Part IV, the author examines both

traditional and newly-emerging aspects of the relationship
between the Executive and Judiciary regarding international law.
The author explains in Part V the current concept of standing
12.
See Ley de Protecci6n al Comercio y la Inversi6n de Normas
Extranjeras que Contravengan el Derecho Internacional, D.O., Oct. 23, 1996.
13.
See IntemationalLaw i Nattonal Courts,International Law Association,
67th Conf., Res. 20 (Aug. 12-17, 1996).
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with respect to international law issues and proposes changes to
the current rules. Part VI suggests means of assisting Mexican
courts in the application of international law. Finally, in Part VII
the author discusses the importance of educating Mexican judges
about international law.
II. THE ROLE AND RANK OF INTERNATiONAL LAw IN THE MEXICAN LEGAL
ORDER

A. The Domestic Status of IntermationalTreaties andAgreements
14
Unlike the legal systems of other Latin American nations,
Mexico's system does not require the domestic introduction of
treaties by special legislation. 15 Instead, treaties concluded by
the Executive and approved by the Senate achieve national status
after their official domestic publication. 16 Mexican courts
consistently equate treaties with legislative acts, 17 affirm their
incorporation into national law, 18 and hold they are binding

throughout the land. 19

For adjudication purposes, whether a

treaty becomes self-executing once domestically in force is
relevant, namely, to determining when private parties may seek
judicial protection against it. 20 Refusal to give effect to treaties on

14.
See, e.g., VENEZ. CoNsr. art. 128 (all treaties and international
conventions must be approved through passage of a special law).
15.

See CARLOS ARELLANO GARCLA, PRIMER CuRso DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL

PUBucO 699 (1993).
16.
See MEX. CoNSr. art. 76, § I; &L.Ley sobre la Celebraci6n de Tratados,
D.O., Jan. 2, 1992, art. 4.
17.
See Amparo en Revisi6n 8396/84, Pietro Antonio Arisis, unanimidad
de votos, Ponente: F.H. Pav6n Vasconcelos (May 14, 1986) (because they contain
abstract and general norms, "international treaties are on the same level as
legislative acts").
18.
See Tercer Tribunal Coleglado en Materla Administrativa del Primer
Circuito, Amparo en Revisi6n 256/81, C.H. Boehrling Sohn, unanimidad de
votos, Ponente: G.D. G6ngora Pimentel (July 9, 1981) ("[Alrticle 133 does not
embrace the theory according to which international law is supreme over
domestic law, but adopts the rule that international law is part of national law").
19.
See "Peyres Vda. De Bell, Francisca," 12 S.J.F. 576 (1928); "Conde,
Manuel E.," 104 S.J.F. 2243 (1950); "Hernndez del Valle, Vinicio," 117 S.J.F.
987 (all holding that "the provisions contained in treaties concluded with foreign
powers have the force of law for the country's inhabitants").
20.
See Ley de Amparo, Reglamentaria de los Articulos 103 y 107 de la
Constituci6n Poliftica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos art. 73, § VI (stating that
the writ of amparo lacks foundation "[against laws, treaties and regulations
whose sole entry into force does not injure the plaintiff, and instead require a
subsequent act of application to cause such injury") [hereinafter Ley deAmparol.

1042

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OFTRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 30:1035

non-self-execution grounds 21 is not, however, a doctrine
22
characteristic of Mexican courts.
In Mexico, which is a federal republic composed of thirty-one
states and the Federal District, the Constitution has a well-known
supremacy clause according national rank to international
treaties:
This Constitution, the laws of the Congress of the Union that stem
therefrom, and all treaties that are in accordance with it, made or
which shall be made by the President of the Republic, with
approval of the Senate, shall be the Supreme Law throughout the
Union. The judges of every State shall be bound by the said
Constitution, laws, and treaties, any provisions to the contrary that
may appear in the Constitutions or laws of the States
23
notwithstanding.

As judicially interpreted, the Constitution "does not
preestablish the subject-matter... of treaties and conventions
concluded by the Government of the Republic," provided they are
in accordance with the Constitution. 24 Mexican judges are bound
to give primacy to constitutional treaties over state laws, but they
are also bound to give primacy to the Constitution over
25
international treaties.
So-called "inter-institutional" agreements between federal,
state, or municipal agencies and foreign governmental organs or
international organizations, although statutorily authorized, are

not part of the supreme law.26

Mexican law admits only the

direct incorporation of "treaties;" the extent to which the
Constitution authorizes "inter-institutional agreements" remains
the subject of dispute. 2 7

21.
See genera!/y Thomas Buergenthal, Self-Executing and Non-SelfExecuting Treaties in National and Intematinal Law, 235 RECUEIL DES COURS 368
(1992).
22.
Mexican law expressly contemplates the possibility of non-selfexecuting treaties requiring the conclusion of subsequent agreements for their
performance. Like foreign policy principles, these provisions are directed toward
the political branches of government, not toward the courts. See Ley sobre la
Celebraci6n de Tratados, art. 2, §§ I & I.
23.
MEx. CONST. art. 133.
See generay JORGE CARPIZO, ESTUDIOS
CoNSmUCIoNALEs 13, 33 (1983).
24.
See Amparo en Revisidn 7798/47, Vera Jos6 Antonio, unanimidad de
cuatro votos (June 11, 1948); see also Baez, supranote 4.
25.
See Amparo en Revisi6n 7798/47, Vera Josd Antonio, unanimidad de
cuatro votos (June 11, 1948) ('The Supreme Court recognizes the primacy of the
Constitution over treaties").
26.
See Ley sobre la Celebraci6n de Tratados, art. 2.
27.
See MEX. CoNsr. art. 76, § I; kI art. 133; Ley sobre la Celebraci6n de
Tratados art 2; CARLOS ARELLANO GARCIA, TLC CRATADO DE LmRE
COMERCIO)/NAFrA (NoRTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT): UNA VOZ CIUDADANA
197-226 (1994); GARciA, supra note 15, at 700-04.
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As for the hierarchy between treaties and federal statutory
law, Mexican courts generally maintain their equal status. 2 8 Yet,
the last-in-time rule is alien to Mexican treaty practice, at least as
it is interpreted under U.S. law.2 9 In Mexican law, an antecedent
rule remains in effect unless a subsequent one expressly repeals
it or the two rules are incompatible.3 0 Independently, this rule
does not necessarily mean that subsequent federal statutes do
not prevail over prior, incompatible treaties merely because
Congress passed them later. When read together, different rules
suggest that treaties will prevail over incompatible federal
legislation.3 1 Overall, the crucial factor is not which of the
but rather which is
incompatible federal norms is later in time,
32
superior in terms of national public order.
B. The InteractionBetween NationalandInternationalNorms
In case of normative conflict, the traditional Mexican system
would grant an injunction against the unconstitutional norm,
without annulling it beyond the concrete cases brought to the
courts.3 3

28.

Under the traditional system, Mexican courts would

See Manuel Becerra Ramirez, Los Poderes de la Federac6nMexdcn y

Las Reladones Intemaconales, n

DERECHO CONsfTrUCIONAL COMPARADO MExco-

EsTADos UNmos 947, 951 ("International treaties have the same hierarchy as
federal laws").
See REsrATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNiTED
29.
STATES § 115 (1987).

30.
31.

See C.C.D.F. art. 9, D.O., Mar. 26, 1928.
See C.C.D.F. art. 11 ("Laws establishing exceptions to general rules are

not applicable in any case not expressly specified in them"); C.C.D.F. art. 12
("Mexican laws rule all persons within the Republic, as well as the acts and deeds
done in her territory or jurisdiction and those submitted to such laws, unless
these foresee the application of foreign law and without, moreover, prejudice of
the provisions of those treaties and conventions to which Mexico is a party"); Ley
Federal de Procedimiento Administrativo, art 1. D.O., Aug. 4, 1994 (providing
that federal legislation applies to administrative acts "without prejudice to the
provisions of international treaties to which Mexico [is] a party").
See, e.g., C.C.D.F. art. 8 ("Acts executed against imperative or public32.
interest laws are null, unless he law commands the contrary"), Ley sobre la
Celebraci6n de Tratados, art. 9 (proscribing the domestic recognition of
international judgments issued in the framework of treaties ratified by Mexico, "if
the State's security, public order, or any other essential national interest is at
stake"); Alcdrreca, 19 S.J.F. 142.
See Ley de Amparo, art. 4 ("Only the party whom the law, international
33.
treaty, regulation or other challenged act injures can exercise the writ of
amparo... "); &cL art. 76 ("The judgments issued in amparo trials shall only
encompass the private individuals or the private or official entities requesting
them, and shall only protect them, where appropriate, in the special case of which
the complaint arises, without making a general declaration about the law or act of
which the complaint arises"). For information on the Mexican writ of amparo, see
CARLOS AREIuANo GARCIA, ELJUIcIo DE AMPARO (1982).
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give no effect to an unconstitutional treaty. Simultaneously,
despite the treaty's supremacy, whether the treaty should remain
in force was always decided within the political branches. The
same was true if a statute contradicted supreme, constitutional
treaties. In addition to determining the outcome of the normative
contradiction, the role of the courts was to influence the outcome
through their concrete case decisions.
The doctrine that the Judiciary should not intervene in the
lawmaking process is no longer an absolute rule of Mexican law.3 4
Since the Supreme Court of Mexico now has the power to
completely invalidate unconstitutional norms,3 5 the domestic role
of international treaties merits particular attention.
The judicial invalidation of unconstitutional treaties
represents an unprecedented check on the Executive and the
Senate. Now supreme treaties comporting to the Constitution can
completely override contrary, namely state legislation.
The
judicial branch also has increasing power to settle both the
normative status of inter-institutional agreements3 6 and the
compatibility of state or municipal agreements with the federal
37
treaty-making powers.
The Judiciary is an increasingly vital actor in foreign affairs.
Because of the powers attained by the judicial branch, the

34.
On the advantages of and objections to the judicial power to Invalidate
general norms, see HECrOR FIX-ZAMUDIo, LINOAMERICA/ CoNSnTrTCI6N, PRocESo
Y DERE HOS HuMANos 360-71 (1988).
35.
See MEX. CONST. art. 105, amended by D.O., Dec. 31, 1994 and D.O.,

Aug. 22, 1996; Ernesto Zedfllo, Reforma al sfstemajudiciaL EXAMEN, Jan. 1995, at
18; Leonel Pereznieto Castro, La reformajudIcal EXAMEN, Jan. 1995, at 13.
36.
Compare Ley sobre la Celebraci6n de Tratados, art. 2, § II (defining
"interinstitutional agreement" as "the agreement governed by public international
law, concluded in writing between any agency or [Mexican] decentralized entity of
the Federal. State, or Municipal public administration and one or several foreign
governmental organs or international organizations, whatever its designation may
be, whether or not it derives from a previously approved treaty") with Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 2, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.
39/27, § 1.
a, D.O., Feb. 14, 1975 (defining "Treaty" as "an International
agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by
International law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more
related instruments and whatever Its particular designation"), and Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International
Organizations or Between International Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986, art. 2(1)(a),
25 LL.M. 543, 545-46 (1986), D.O., Jan. 11, 1988 (same definition, mutatis
mutands). See infra Parts IV & V.
37.
See MEx. CONST. art. 117, § I (proscribing the conclusion of treaties
between any individual Mexican state and foreign states); Juicio Ordinario
Federal 17/46, Informe 1956, Pleno, at 32-34, reprinted In 7 DERECHOS DEL
PUEBLO MECeANO, supra note 3, at 976 (Supreme Court's ruling that its plenary
has authority to hear controversies affecting the national interests, including
cases where "one State concludes an alliance, treaty, or coalition with . . . a
foreign power"); GARcfA, supra note 15, at 700-04. See infra Parts IV & V.
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principle of supremacy is increasingly prone to influence
lawmaking and the conclusion of international treaties and
agreements. Nonetheless, in the Mexican order it does not suffice
to address the domestic applicability and role of international
norms exclusively in terms of supremacy. Mexican law accords
domestic effect to certain treaty-based international "Judgments,
arbitral awards, and jurisdictional resolutions."3 8 In the Mexican
federal system, private international law treaties often involve not
only issues of public policy and normative hierarchy, but also
issues of forum selection.3 9

Human rights treaties embody evolving standards for the
judicial application and interpretation of constitutional
freedoms. 40 International treaties and conventions can shape
new constitutional principles, as is occurring now in the
41
framework of Mexico's nationality reform.

38.
See Ley sobre la Celebraci6n de Tratados, arts. 8 & 11 (guidelines on
and effects of treaty-based dispute settlement between the Mexican government
or Mexican nationals, on the one hand, and foreign governments, foreigners, or
international organizations, on the other). Compare with Act No. 288 of 1996,
D.O., Jul. 5, 1996 (Colom.) (regulating the domestic effects of money decisions of
the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and the Human Rights Committee
of the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). On the position of Mexico in
respect to international human rights bodies and tribunals, see JESfrs RODRfGUEZ
Y RODRfGUEZ, COMISION NAcIoNAL DE DERECHOS HUMANos (hereinafter C.N.D.H.) Los
SISrEMAS ImTERNAcIoNALEs DE PRoTEccI6N DE Los DERECHOS HuMANos (1996);
Jorge Cicero, Thesis, Mdxtco y el Protocolo Facultawo del Pacto Internactonal de
Derechos Civiles y Politicos (1989) (on file with the International Law Department
of the U.NA.M. Law School).
39.
See, e.g., Inter-American Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, arts. 4 & 5, 42 OAS.T.S., D.O., Apr. 27, 1978 (leaving
the determination of which is the " competent authority" regarding recognition and
execution of awards to the laws of the State where recognition or execution is
requested, and establishing the public policy exception); Inter-American
Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards,
May 8, 1979, arts. 2 & 6, 51 O.S.T.S., D.O., Aug. 20, Nov. 30, 1987.
40.
See, e.g., Jorge Cicero, The Allen Tort Statute of 1789 as a Remedy for
Injuries to Foreign NationalsHosted by the United States, 23 COLUM. HUM. Rrs. L.
REV. 315, 351-52 (1992).
41.
See Proyecto de Decreto que Reforma los Ardculos 30, 32 y 37 de la
Constltuci6n Poaftica, Dictamen de las Comisiones Undas de Puntos
Constituclonales, de Gobernac6n, Primera Secctdn, de Asuntos Migratortos, de
Asuntos Fronterizos Zona Norte y Zona Sur y Estudlos Legtslaftls [Draft Decree
Amending Articles 30, 32 and 37 of the Political Constitution, Opinion of the Joint

Commission on Constitutional Issues, Governmental Affairs, First Section,
Migration Affairs, Border Affairs North and South Zones, and Legislative Studies],
Primera Secci6n, Nov. 21, 1996 (introducing the principle that "[tihe law shall
regulate the exercise of the rights Mexican legislation grants to Mexicans that
possess other nationalities and shall establish norms to prevent dual nationality
conflicts," after considering the provisions of treaties on dual nationality and

political rights).
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As summarized by Alberto Szdkely, the harmonization and
coexistence of international treaties with the Mexican order into
which they are incorporated includes the following possibilities:
1) That the provisions on the same subject-matter, both in the
domestic order and in the text of the International instrument, are
essentially identical or harmonious.
2) That the domestic
provisions go beyond those of the instrument, In the sense not of
contradicting it, but of fulfilling it in excess. 3) That the domestic
order only partially foresees the norms of the international text,
vthout contradicting it in the regulated portion. 4) That the
domestic order does not foresee at all the international norms
stipulated in the treaty. 5) That between the provisions on the
same subject-matter.., there are discrepancies, In the sense one
may not be fulfilled without contradicting the other.
Instances three and four open three possibilities: (1) that the
international text binds the State to legislate on the subject-matter
before acceptance; (2) that It allows the State to legislate after the
acceptance; or (3) that the same text covers the gap in the domestic
order upon the text's incorporation into the domestic order.4 2

In Mexico's monist system, one could hardly limit the
interactions between treaties and domestic laws to instances of

normative conflict. Representing inherently related dimensions of
a single constitutional order, the presumption is not that national
and international norms in force in the Republic contradict each

other.

The presumption is, instead, that one supplements the

other.

III. ENSURING MEXICO'S HIGH COURrS' CONSIDERATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL QUESTONS

A. The Local Supreme Tribunals

In addition to the role of specialized courts in Mexico, each
constituent unit's supreme tribunal of justice has authority to
consider and apply international treaties where appropriate. As
the text of the Constitution makes clear, one purpose of the
supremacy clause is precisely to ensure the fulfillment of

international undertakings by courts and tribunals throughout
the Mexican Republic.

43

As already noted, the Constitution of Mexico now establishes

a novel set of remedies specifically designed to settle supremacy

42.
See Alberto Szdkely, Mdxco y los Instrumentos de las Nactones Undas
sobreDerechos Humanos, in LA PROTECCI6N INTERNACIONAL DE Los DERECHOS DEL
HOMBRE, BALANcEY PERSPECIVAS 209, 210-11 (1983).
43.
See MEX. CoNsr. art. 133: supratext accompanying note 23.
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disputes. Here, suffice it to recall one opinion that the supremacy
clause authorizes "every judge in the Republic" to decide "whether
the laws governing the subject-matter of the case are in
accordance with the Constitution, if such issue is at stake, for to
accept the contrary would be to impose upon the judges a duty
without providing them the means [that are] essential to carry it
44
out."

This reasoning holds for supremacy as it applies to
international treaties, and the Constitution of Mexico ensures
limited local jurisdiction over treaty-related controversies in the
following clause:
Federal tribunals shall have cognizance of... all civil and criminal
controversies about the fulfilment and application of federal laws or

of international treaties concluded by the Mexican State. If such
controversies affect only the interests of private parties, the regular
Judges and tribunalsof the States and the FederalDistrict may also
have cognizance, at the choice of the plaintiff. The judgments can be
appealed before the immediate superior of the judge originally
45
cognizant of the matter.

Legislative history reveals the clause was conceived for the
judicial consideration of "individual rights deriving from
treaties."4 6 Its framers expected the clause to provide grounds for
international claims "only in case of denial of justice."4 7 Its
adoption shows concern about foreign intervention on behalf of
foreign nationals and seeks 4to
prevent it by encouraging the
8
exercise of domestic remedies.
Related legislation clarifies that the constitutional reference
to "civil controversies" encompasses those that are not "criminal"
49
and not exclusively those that arise between private parties.

44.
See 8 DERECHOS DEL PUEBLO MEXIcNo, supranote 3, at 942.
45.
MMx. CONSr. art. 104, § I (emphasis added). Cf. U.S. CoNsT. art. M, § 2
('The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases ... arising under this Constitution,
the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority"), and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1996) (district courts "shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States").
46.
See Debates de Constituyente de 1856, reprinted in 7 DERECHOS DEL
PUEBLO MEXmcANo, supranote 3, at 953 (statement of Mr. Arriaga).
47.
See il. at 949 (statement of Mr. Guzmdn).
48.
For a discussion of similar concerns leading to the federalization of
foreign affairs, alienage jurisdiction, and foreign tort claims in the United States,
see Cicero, supranote 40, at 328-36.
49.
See Ley Orgdnica del Poder Judicial de la Federacidn, arts. 50, § I(a),
D.O., May 26, 1995 (jurisdiction of federal courts on criminal matters over crimes
foreseen in federal laws and treaties); kl. art. 52, § I (jurisdiction of federal courts
on administrative matters over federal questions arising out of the legality of
administrative acts or procedures); (d. art. 53, § I (reproducing Article 104, § 1); id.
art. 55, § I (jurisdiction of federal courts on labor matters over federal questions
arising out of the legality of acts or procedures of labor authorities).
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Still, the clause is jurisdictional; it suggests that, as a rule, the
plaintiff should bring the treaty controversy within a civil remedy
or other ordinary right of action.5 0 After all, the Constitution
places the controversy not under devices specifically conceived for
constitutional review, but within the regular jurisdiction of federal
51

courts.

The subsequent addition of limited concurrent jurisdiction
prevents overloads in the federal judicial system. 5 2
In the
constituent units, each regular supreme tribunal normally
reviews trial judgments. 5 3 By expressly providing appeals to
superior courts, the concurrent jurisdiction clause further
ensures the consideration of treaty controversies by high
54
tribunals throughout the Mexican Republic.

Constitutionally, the operation of concurrent jurisdiction does
not depend upon the existence of harmonious local laws.5 5
Lacking harmonious rules in a federal unit, the Constitution of

Mexico-as supreme national law-suffices for the exercise of
concurrent jurisdiction.5

6

Uniform concurrent jurisdiction rules

in each federal unit could further encourage the consideration of
treaties by local courts and supreme tribunals.5 7

50.
See, e.g., C.P.C.D.F. arts. 2-34 (types and general rules of civil actions):
C.C.D.F. arts. 1910-34 (civil remedies for damages arising of illicit acts, moral
damage, liability of public officials and of the State as such).
51.
See Hdctor FIx-Zamudio, Artfculo 104, Comentaro, in CoNsTrTUcI6N
PoLfInCADE Los EsrAnos UNIDOS MEXICANOS, CoMENrADA 436, 442 (1992).
52.
See td. at 438.
53.
See, e.g., N.L. CoNsr. art. 100, § I (Constitution of the State of Nuevo
Leon).
54.
The United Mexican States comprise the following territorial units:
Aguascallentes, Baja California, Baja California Sur, Campeche, Coahuila,
Colima, Chiapas, Chihuahua, Durango, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Jalisco,
Mdxico, Michoacdn, Morelos, Nayarit, Nuevo Ledn, Oaxaca, Puebla, Querdtaro,
Quintana Roo, San Lis Potosi, Sinaloa, Sonora, Tabasco, Tamaulipas, TIaxcala,
Veracruz, YucatAn, Zacatecas, the Federal District See MEx. CoNsr. arts. 43-48.
55.
See Jursdiccln Concurrente (Es Competente el Juez elegtdo por el
actor), Comp. 50/54, Informe 1954, Pleno at 144, reprinted in 7 DERECHOS DEL
PUEBLO MEMCANO, supranote 3, at 975.
56.
See I. ("according to [AIrticle 133 of the Political Constitution, this
constitutes the Supreme Law of all the Union and, for the same reason, Its
content cannot be undermined by laws of lesser hierarchy because It integrates a

superlegality prevailing over the federal and ordinary laws, land] allow[s] the

plaintiff to choose the judge [under constitutional Article 104's concurring
jurisdiction]").
57.
For useful models and background, see CoNSnTUCION POLtICA DEL
ESrADO IBRE Y SOBERANO DE MaixiCO (Constitution of the State of Mexico) art. 88
("The exercise of the Judiciary is vested upon [the] Superior Tribunal of Justice,
and trial and lesser-amount courts that shall take cognizance of and shall resolve
... concurrent jurisdiction and local criminal, civil and family controversies, as
well as [controversies] on the international treaties foreseen in the Federal
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Concurrent jurisdiction, often used in commercial matters, is
particularly suitable for the local consideration of treaties on
private international law. Mexico is party, for instance, to the
1994 Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts
(hereinafter Convention).58 Lacking contractual choice of law and
forum, concurrent jurisdiction allows local tribunals to settle
international commercial disputes between private parties by
applying the rules established in the Convention.
Other cases initially fall within local supreme tribunals not
because of concurrent jurisdiction, but because of a treaty's
subject matter. Mexico is party, for example, to multilateral
treaties relating to family law,5 9 which is local in Mexico's federal
system. 60 Moreover, resort to local courts makes particular sense
for the service of process and in disputes between parties residing
61
In border areas.

B. FederalCourts
1. Jurisdiction and Authority
In the Mexican constitutional system, controversies about
treaties fall within the exclusive domain of the federal judiciary if

they concern interests beyond "private parties."6 2

Whether

federal courts have concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction depends
on the circumstances of each case.
Mexican case law traditionally deems that "the punctual
fulfilment of international treaties is a concern of the Society and
the State." 63 Cases in which a private party invoking a treaty
seeks civil remedies against another private party do not

Constitution"). See genera!y Ley Orgdnica de Poder Judicial Federal, D.O., May
26, 1995.
58.
See Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International
Contracts, Mar. 17, 1994, arts. 25-27, 78 O.A.S.T.S., 33 I.L.M. 732 (1994).
59.
See, e.g., Inter-American Convention on Conflict of Laws Concerning
the Adoption of Minors, May 24, 1984, 62 O.S.T.S., D.O., May 26, 1988.
60.
Compare MMx. CoNST. art 124 ("The powers that are not expressly
granted to federal officials by this Constitution, are deemed to be reserved by the
States"), wtth U.S. CoNSr. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people").
61.
See, e.g., Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory, Jan. 30,
1975, art. 7, 43 O.A.S.T.S., D.O., Apr. 25, 1978 ("Courts in border areas of the
party states may directly execute the letters rogatory contemplated in this
Convention and such letters shall not require legalization").
62.
See MEx CoNST. art. 104, § I. See also supratext accompanying note
45.
63.
See"Gordon, Ben," 6 S.J.F. 43 (5a dpoca 1920).
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necessarily concern public interests.

However, treaty-based

challenges to public acts, controversies about the governmental
fulfilment of treaties, and attempts to block the domestic
performance of a treaty, present a different situation. 64
Similar to courts in other federal States, the high federal
courts in Mexico have final authority in the domestic
interpretation of treaties. 65 The relevant constitutional clause
provides:
The law shall indicate under which terms the jurisprudence
established by the tribunals of the Federal Judicial Power on the
Interpretation of the Constitution, federal or local laws and
regulations, and international treates concluded by the Mexican
66
State, is mandatory, also how it may be interrupted or modified.

Formerly, Mexican law paralleled the constitutional language
about "the interpretation of the Constitution, federal or local laws,
and international treaties."6 7 Federal legislation, however, no
longer reproduces this language; rather, it now focuses on how
the higher courts establish jurisprudence, taking for granted their
constitutional authority to interpret treaties and other general

norms.

68

Although this development distracts attention from the
judicial authority to interpret treaties, another overlooked fact is
much more important in the establishment of jurisprudence on
the subject, Mexican courts have yet to develop a tradition of
considering international standards of interpretation.
It is a

familiar comment that Mexico's supremacy clause and the Vienna

Convention on the Law of Treaties reflect different approaches
concerning the hierarchy of national and international law. 6 9 Yet,

64.
For traditional criteria about whether a federal controversy affects
national interests and is suitable for hearing by the Plenary Tribunal of the
Supreme Court, see Juicio Ord. Fed. 17/46, Informe 1956, Pleno at 32-34,
reprintedin 7 DERECHOS DEL PUEBLO MExIcANO, supranote 3, at 976.
65.
For information regarding emerging interactions between an
international tribunal's interpretation of an instrument as a matter of
international law and the judicial application, as a matter of domestic law, of
these international decisions, see THoMAs BUERGENHAL, INTERNAIoNAL TRIBuNALs
AND NAaiONAL Couirs: THE INERNATONAuZATION OF DOMEsflC ADJUDICATION (1994).
66.
MEX. CONST. art. 94 (emphasis added).
67.
See Ley de Amparo, arts. 192-93 (former text), reprinted in MIGUEL
AcosrA ROMERO & GENARo DAVID GONGORA PIMt
, LEY DE AMPARO: LEGISIACION,
JURISPRUDENCLA DocTmiA 884-87 (2d ed., 1985).
68.
See id. (amended text).
69.
See Szdkely, supra note 42, at 211-12 ("There Is no doubt that, in the
domestic Mexican order, treaties are subordinated to the Constitution," nor is
there any doubt "that the Vienna Convention proclaims the supremacy, at the
international level, of international law over domestic law," except for the vague
situation foreseen in article 46); see also Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, supra note 36, art. 27 (stipulating that a State "may not invoke the
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it would be misleading and inaccurate to conclude that the
Vienna Convention and other international interpretive rules have
a limited role before Mexican courts in light of constitutional
supremacy.
In criminal matters, the Constitution of Mexico disallows the
retroactive application of the law and its extensive interpretation
to the detriment of the defendant.70 In non-criminal cases,
judgments must follow "the letter or the juridical interpretation of
interpretations, must they follow
the law." 7 1 Only lacking such
72
"the general principles of law."
Thus, in the establishment of jurisprudence, nothing
precludes the consideration of treaties for the benefit of
prisoners 73 or for developing progressive judicial criteria to
prevent irreparable damage to persons. 7 4 More generally, the
Vienna Convention, which is part of Mexican law, embodies
generally recognized standards
for the "juridical interpretation" of
international agreements. 75
To further develop the legislation governing federal
jurisprudence on treaties, and to encourage the establishment of

provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty"), &d.
art. 46 (invalidity of treaties because of "manifest" violations of internal law
regarding the competence to conclude treaties).
70.
See MEX. CONSr. art. 14; Horacio Lombardo, Interpretacd6nJurkdca, in
5 DIccIONA O JURiDIco MxicANo 178-79 (1984).
71.
MEX. CoNs. art 14.
72.
Id.

73.
See, e.g., American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art.
9, 36 O-AS.T.S., D.O., May 7, 1981 (entered into force July 18, 1978) ("If

subsequent to the commission of the offense the law provides for the imposition
of a lighter punishment, the guilty person shall benefit therefrom"): id. art. 29 ("No
provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as: a. permitting any party state,
group, or person to suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the rights and freedoms
recognized in this Convention or to restrict them to a greater extent than is
provided for herein; b. restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right
recognized by virtue of the laws of any party state or by virtue of another
convention to which one of the said states is a party").
See, e.g., MEX. CONST. art. 22 (freedom from torture); Ley Federal para
74.
Prevenir y Sancionar la Tortura, art. 6, D.O., May 27, 1986 (obligation to
immediately denounce acts of torture); Inter-American Convention to Prevent and
Punish Torture, Dec. 9, 1985, 67 O.A.S.T.S., D.O., Sept. 11, 1987, arts. 1 & 6
(undertaking of the party states to "take effective measures to prevent and punish
torture within their jurisdiction"); Ley de Amparo, arts. 123 & 137 (providing for
habeas corpus decrees in urgent cases, to prevent torture, solitary confinement,
and arbitrary detention).
75.
On the use of the Vienna Convention by the Argentine Supreme Court
to give domestic effect to international undertakings, see BUERGEIMIrHAL, supra
note 65, at 12 (discussing Ekmekdjlan v. Sofovic. Judgment of December 1,
1988, which gave judicial effect to the internationally recognized right of reply and
departed from previous precedent holding the equal rank of treaties and federal
statutes); Buergenthal, supra note 21, at 358-59.
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jurisprudence in harmony with international undertaldngs, the
following or similar proposals merit consideration:
0
In applying and interpreting treaties concluded by the
Mexican State, the Judiciary shall consider the interpretive rules
established by the treaty in question or by other applicable
conventions, if the provisions of the treaty are unclear. The
Judiciary may consider any supplementary sources that it deems
appropriate.
•
In applying and interpreting constitutional precepts,
legislation, and other general norms whose subject is the matter of
treaties concluded by the Mexican State, the Judiciary shall
endeavor to consider the applicable treaties that it deems
appropriate.
These
alternatives
would
enhance
awareness
about
intemationally-recognized standards of interpretation, without
restricting judicial discretion or advocating the unnecessary use
of supplementary means. 76 They would also focus attention on
the possibility of using international instruments to interpret
domestic laws.
2. Ensuring Treaty Questions Reach the High Courts
Federal
questions
about international
treaties
and
agreements may now reach the Supreme Court of Mexico through
the new invalidation powers, which are the subject of other
sections of this Article. 7 7 Yet, to fully realize their repercussions
and scope, it is essential to discuss how treaty questions reach
the high federal courts in ordinary and amparo7 8 litigation.
a. The Supreme Court's Powers and Exclusive Jurisdiction

In ordinary federal litigation, circuit unitary tribunals review
the trial judgments of labor, administrative, civil, and criminal
federal courts. 7 9
If the federal government is a party, the
Chambers of the Supreme Court have the power to hear appeals
relating to federal interests and questions of supremacy. 80 The
interpretation and fulfllment of treaties, within controversies
involving civil remedies or other ordinary actions, would likely
meet this standard.

76.
& 32.
77.
78.
79.
80.
21, § I.

See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 36, arts. 31
See infra Parts IV &V.
See infra Part M.B.2.b.
See Ley Orgdnica del Poder Judicial, art. 29, § I.
See MEx. CONSr. art. 105, § Im; Ley Orgnica del Poder Judicial, art.

1997]

INTERINATIONAL LAW IN MEXICAN COURTS

1053

As for the Plenary of the Mexican Supreme Court, it is longstanding precedent that in ordinary litigation it has the power to
hear federal questions affecting national interests. 8 1
Like
analogous, exclusive amparo jurisdiction, this includes federal
laws or acts encroaching on a constituent unit's jurisdiction, and
local laws or acts encroaching on the federal government's
82
jurisdiction.
These powers and jurisdiction denote the ability to hear and

resolve controversies involving not only agreements concluded by
state or municipal authorities, 83 but also the "federal clauses"

that some treaties stipulate. 8 4 In Mexico, as in the United States,
the constituent units retain all powers that the Constitution does
not expressly grant to the national government.8 5 At the same
time, federal clauses endowed with normative supremacy may
entail immediate undertakings on domestic matters within each
86
constituent unit's jurisdiction.

81.

See Juicio Ord. Fed. 17/46, Informe 1956, Pleno at 32-34, reprintedin

7 DERECHOS DELPUEBLO MEXICANO, supranote 3, at 976.

82.
See id.; ROMERO & PIMENrEL, supra note 67, at 32-33 (discussing
Plenary's exclusive jurisdiction should such issues arise in amparolitigation); see
also ME CONS. art. 103, §§ I & Ill; Ley de Amparo, art. 1, §§ H &IM.
83.
See supranote 36 and accompanying text.
84.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELAnONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 302, n.4 (1987).
85.
See MEx. CONST. art. 124; U.S. CONST. amend. X
86.
For example, the American Convention on Human Rights provides as
follows:
1. Where a party state is constituted as a federal state, the national
government of such party state shall implement all the provisions of the
Convention over whose subject matter it exercises legislative and judicial
jurisdiction.
2. With respect to the provisions over whose subject matter the
constituent units of the federal state have jurisdiction, the national
government shall immediately take suitable measures, in accordance with
its constitution and its laws, to the end that the competent authorities of
the constituent units may adopt appropriate provisions for the fulfillment
of this Convention.
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 73, art. 28, 91911 & 2.

Cornparewifh International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966,
art. 50, GAJ Res. 2200 (XXI, GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 52, D.O., May 20, 1981
(entered Into force Mar. 23, 1976) ("he provisions of the present Covenant shall
extend to all parts of federal States without limitations or exceptions"), and
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (enteredintoforce
Apr. 22, 1954), reprinted in BAsic DoCUMENTs ON HUMAN RiGHTS 64, 79 (lan
Brownlie, ed., 3d. ed., 1992) (undertaking of federal governments to bring articles
falling within the jurisdiction of constituent units "with a favourable
recommendation to the notice of the appropriate authorities of states, provinces
or cantons.").
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It is hard to sustain the claim that federal clauses centralize
in one governmental branch or in the national government
matters that are subjects of the respective treaties and of state
law.
Although Mexico's constituent units have expressly
87
delegated the treaty-maklng powers to the national government,
the supremacy of treaties concluded by the Mexican State is a
matter separate from the constitutional distribution of powers to
carry them out. The judicial branch may directly apply treaties
but cannot pass the legislation they may require. Crimes whose

punishment is found in state law do not necessarily fall within
the original jurisdiction of federal courts, regardless of whether
supreme treaties touch the same subject.
The problem is not so much the scope of the treaty-making
powers; rather, it is that federal clauses may require affirmative
measures whose adoption initially falls to the constituent units. 8 8
If a unit refrains from carrying out the treaty, and the national
powers do not take suitable action, the federal state as a whole
may be held responsible. 89 Few questions of international law so
clearly fall within the Supreme Court of Mexico's original
jurisdiction and inherent powers as the domestic effects of these
federal clauses.
b. Amparo Litigation and Jurisprudence
The purpose of the writ of amparo is to protect individuals
who request the writ against acts of authority or general norms
that violate individual constitutional guarantees. 9 0 Relief usually
consists of restitution and injunctions; but in cases of
governmental omission the relief may be specific performance. 9 1
Alternate forms of relief are now permissible in certain
circumstances.

92

Five uninterrupted, consistent amparo rulings by the
Supreme Court's Plenary, its Chambers, or collegiate circuit
tribunals generate a higher form of case law. 93
Resolutions
settling contradictory precedent have the same effect. 9 4 The

87.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 302 cmt. d (1987).
88.

See, e.g., American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 73, art.

28, T 2.
89.
See, e.g., Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26,
1933, art. 2, 37 O.A.S.T.S., D.O., Apr. 21, 1936 (affirming that the federal state
constitutes "a sole person" under international law).
90.
SeeMEx. CONST. arts. 103& 107; Ley deAmparo, art. 1.
91.
See Ley de Amparo, art. 80.
92.
See MEx. CoNST. art. 107, § XVI, amended by D.O., Dec. 31, 1994.
93.
See Ley de Amparo, art. 192.

94.

See (d.
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Plenary resolves contradictions between the Chambers, and it is
generally for the Chambers to resolve contradictions between
collegiate circuit tribunals. 9 5 The Plenary's case law and that of
its Chambers bind every court in the Republic. 9 6 The case law of
collegiate tribunals binds lower federal courts and courts
97
generally.
The extent to which these long-standing rules will endure is
unclear. Structural changes in the composition and organization
of the federal judiciary seek to transform the Supreme Court
exclusively into a constitutional tribunal. 9 8 To that effect, one
proposal calls for the establishment of another high tribunal with
the exclusive purpose of unifyilng the amparo case law of collegiate
tribunals. 99
As the law currently stands, there are several ways of
ensuring the consideration of treaties in amparo litigation and
jurisprudence.10 0
Mexican courts espouse that "the writ of
amparo is admissible against the improper application of a

treaty."10 ' Thus, amparo has been granted to determine that
"appropriate means" to enforce a United States-Mexico convention
on stolen vehicles should be interpreted as "no other than judicial
means." 102 By resorting to alternate means, without affording due
process, the authority was "not only infringing the Constitution,

95.
96.

See Ley Orgdnica del Poder Judicial, art. 10, § VIII; 0d. art. 21, § VIII.
See Ley de Amparo, art. 192.

97.
See tcL art. 193.
98.
See Josd Luis Soberanes Ferrandez, Nueva Justida Conslltudonal en
Mdxico, CR5NicALEGISLATIVA, Apr.-May 1996, at 13, 23. The previous composition
of the Mexican Supreme Court was 21 "numerary" and a maximum of five
"supernumerary" (Le., alternate) Justices. Its previous organization was the
plenary, four regular chambers, and one auxiliary chamber. Currently, 11
Justices compose Mexico's highest Court. Besides the Plenary Tribunal, only two
Chambers function now- Civil and Criminal Matters; and Administrative and
Labor Matters. See MEX. CONST. art. 96, amended by D.O., Dec. 31, 1994;
"Acuerdo Nfimero 1/1995 del Tribunal Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicla de
la Naci6n, Relativo a la Especializacidn de las Salas de la Suprema Corte de
Justicla de la Naci6n y a la Adscripcidn de los Seflores Ministros," D.O., Feb. 13,
1995; "Acuerdo Nfimero 2/1995 del Tribunal Pleno de la Suprema Corte de
Justicla de la Naci6n, Relativo a la Distribuci6n de Asuntos Entre las Salas y los
Seflores Ministros," D.O., Feb. 13, 1995; compare with Ley Orgdnica del Poder
Judicial de la Federaci6n, D.O., Jan. 5, 1988, repealedby Ley Orgdnlca del Poder
Judicial, arts. 15-28.
99.
See Soberanes, supranote 98, at 19.
100. In the transition toward the new institutions, compatible legislation in
force applies. See"Decreto Mediante el cual se Reforman los Articulos 21, 55, 76,
79, 89, 93-108, 110, 111, 116, 122 y 123 de la Constitucidn Politica de los

Estados Unidos Meidcanos," D.O., Dec. 31, 1994.

101.

Amparo en Revisi6n 8123/63, Manuel Brafia L., cinco votos, Ponente:

Indrritu (Aug. 13, 1965).
102. See Vera v. Procuraduria General de la Repfiblica, Amparo en Revisi6n
7298/47, 96 S.J.F. 1639 (1948).
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but the3 Convention itself, which has the rank of constitutional
law."

0

The protective radius of constitutional due process and
10 4
ensuring legality extends amparo protection to various "rights."
This is true for treaty-based rights that do not technically
correspond to a constitutional guarantee. 10 5 Similarly, human
rights treaties give evolving, progressive scope to constitutional
legality and due process commands suitable for amparo
jurisprudence and protection. Carlos Arellano Garcia explains
how the writ of amparo operates for purposes of guaranteeing
legality:
a) It is an individual guarantee of the citizen that the public
authority must comport its behavior to the laws authorizing it to
act. The principle that the State only can do that which it Is legally
allowed to gets constitutional rank and the status of individual
right.

b) Since the State's authorities must respect individual
guarantees, among them, they respect the guarantee of legality
establishing the strict observance of that which the laws provide.
c) So, regarding the State's authority, the behavior of the State's
authorities is limited not only by the constitutionality of their acts
but also by the legality of their conduct
d) Since there is a means for the control of the constitutionality of
the acts of the State's authorities, and since the legality Is a
constitutional guarantee, the means of control becomes a means
for controal]ling the legality of their behavior.
In the Mexican order, the writ of amparo... is actionable against
acts of authority that violate individual guarantees. In turn,
articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution establish.., the guarantee
of legality. Therefore, by invoking constitutional articles 14 and 16,
the writ of amparo controls not only the constitutionality in the
behavior of the State's authority, but also the legality in the
behavior of the same State's authorities. 106

Given the monist system Mexico follows, human rights
treaties in force in the Republic are part of the laws that specify
the limits of the State's behavior. The proscription against
depriving any person of her rights without "trial" (i.e., a hearing)
and "essential procedural formalities" (i.e., due or minimum
guarantees) illustrates overlapping constitutional-international
103. Id. But see supratext accompanying note 28.
104. See MErx CONST. art. 14 ("No one shall be deprived of his life, liberty,
property, possessions or rights without trial before previously established
tribunals, in which essential procedural formalities are met, and in conformity
with previously established laws"); see also MEX. CoNSr. art. 16 (guaranteeing that
every act of authority be legally grounded and reasoned).
105. For information on the correlation between constitutionally and
internationally recognized human rights in Mexico, see Jsus RODRIGUEZ Y
RODRIGUEZ, ESTUDIOS SOBRE DEREcHos
INTERNAcIONALFs 41-94 (1990).

106.

GARCiA, supranote 33, at 266-70.

HUmANos: AspEcros NAcIoNALs E
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due process.' 0 7 Even so, in amparo litigation, the usual way of
making treaty-based human rights effective before the courts is
by relying exclusively on corresponding constitutional guarantees.
c. Prospective Avenues
In different matters, Mexican law allows judges to rectify
technical errors or omissions in the complaint (suplencia de la
deficiencia de la quija).'0 8
In amparo litigation, judicial
rectification typically operates in cases involving unconstitutional
norms, manifest deprivations of due process, or the vulnerable
and the disadvantaged: prisoners, minors, and parties to labor
and agrarian matters.' 0 9 Rectification of technicalities, though
not designed to relieve every procedural requirement, leaves
considerable room for the application of treaty norms that relate
to the due administration of justice.
The National Human Rights Commission's Regulations define
human rights as "those recognized In the Constitution and those
recognized in covenants, treaties and conventions" ratified by
Mexico." t0
To advance the application of treaties by high
tribunals and courts generally, whether the parties invoke them
or not, the inclusion of analogous provisions in the Mexican
Constitution is worthy of consideration."'
Besides modeling
additional constitutional guarantees after human rights treaties,

107. Compare MEx. CoNsr. art. 14 (right not to be deprived of any right
without trial), with International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note
86, art. 14 (right to a fair and public hearing and minimum guarantees).
108.

See, e.g., C.P.C.D.F. art. 46, D.O., Sept. 21, 1932 (rectification of

technicalities in favor of parties without counsel, judicial duty to appoint counsel).
On the incorporation of this principle to the new invalidation powers of the
Supreme Court, see infra text accompanying notes 183-85.
109.

See Ley de Amparo art. 76; INsnTuro DE ESPEcmuZAcION JUDICiAL DE

LA SUPREMA CoRT DE JUSTCI DE LA NACION, MANuAL DEL JuicIo DE AMPARO 37-40
(1988).
110. See Reglamento Interno de la Comision Nacional de Derechos

Humanos, art. 6, D.O., Nov. 12, 1992; Ley de la Comision Nacional de Derechos
Humanos, art. 1, D.O., June 29, 1992.
111. See, e.g., COLOM. CONsr. arts. 93 ("The rights and duties enshrined in

this Charter, shall be interpreted in conformity with the international treaties on
human rights ratified by Colombia"); id. art. 94 ("The enunciation of rights and
guarantees included in the Constitution and in the international agreements in

force[,J shall not be understood as denying others that, being inherent in the
human person, do not expressly appear in them"); see also SPAN. CONST. art. 10(2)
("The norms on fundamental rights and freedoms recognized by the Constitution
shall be interpreted in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the international treaties and agreements on the same matters ratified by
Spain"); PoRT. CONS?. art. 16(2) ('The constitutional and legal precepts on
fundamental rights shall be interpreted and integrated in harmony with the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights").
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consideration should also be given to expressly granting
1 12
constitutional rank to selected international instruments.

IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BEIWEEN THE JUDICIARY AND THE EXECUTIVE IN

IWERNATIONAL LEGAL QUESTIONS
Echoing the U.S. Constitution, which authorizes federal
jurisdiction over controversies about treaties, maritime law cases,
cases concerning consular and diplomatic agents, and
extraditions, the Constitution of Mexico assigns the federal
judiciary a significant role in foreign affairs.' 13 This role is also
evident in the Mexican judicial courts' exclusive jurisdiction over
all Mexican governmental acts within and outside of the national

territory."

4

Nevertheless, unlike U.S. courts, Mexican courts

have not developed a "political question" doctrine deferring to the
executive or legislative branches on questions of international
5
law.

Despite practical and conceptual overlaps, it is possible to
group the traditional Judiciary-Executive relationships on
questions of international law arising before Mexican courts
essentially into four categories: (1) the Executive as plaintiff or
defendant; (2) the Executive as representative of public interests
before the Judiciary; (3) the Executive as assistant of the
Judiciary; and (4) judicial opinions to the Executive. In addition

112. See ARGEN. CONST. art. 75, § 22 (giving treaties superiority over laws
and selected human rights instruments a supreme status in the constitutional
hierarchy); Hdctor Fix-Zamudio, El Derecho Internaclonal de los Derechos
Humanos en las Consttuciones Latlnoamerlcn y en la Corte Interamericanade
Derechos Humanos, in THE MODERN WORLD OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ESSAYS IN HONOR OF

THOMAS BUERGENTHAL 159, 161-73 (Ant6nio Cancado Trindade, ed. 1996).
113. Compare MEx. CONST. art. 104 ("Federal tribunals shall have
cognizance of: all civil and criminal controversies about... international treaties
concluded by the Mexican State... ; all controversies about maritime law... ;

cases concerning members of the Consular and Diplomatic Corps), and MEX.
CONSr. art. 119, amended by D.O., Sept. 3, 1993 ("The extraditions requested by
foreign States shall be substantiated by the Federal Executive, with the
intervention of the judicial authority in the terms of [the] Constitution, the
International Treaties signed in this respect, and the regulatory laws"), with U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases... arising under
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under [U.S.] authority;-to all Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; ... To Controversies... between a State, or
the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. In all Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls . . . the supreme
Court shall have original Jurisdiction").
114. See C.F.P.C. art. 568.
115. See generally Edward Gordon,.American Courts, InternationalLaw and
"PoliticalQuestions"Which TouchForeignRelations, 14 IN'LIw. 297 (1980).
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to these traditional categories, there are several emerging
developments which warrant discussion.
A. The TraditionalSpectrum
1. The Executive as Plaintiff or Defendant
In criminal matters, the Offices of the Attorneys General of
the Republic, of Military Justice, of each state and of the Federal
District act as plaintiffs. These organs, which technically fall
within the executive branch, primarily raise before the courts
questions of international law that may require the punishment of
crimes. One example is whether treaty provisions directly apply
when a treaty in force in Mexico forbids the crime and the Penal
Code does not.' 16 Another example is the assertion of Mexican
jurisdiction to punish crimes committed or17originated abroad in
circumstances specified by the Penal Code.'
In contrast, in amparo litigation defendants include executive
authorities. Contempt in amparo decrees may result in the
responsible authority's removal and conviction.'1 8 This stands, of
course, for injunctions against laws or acts contradicting supreme
treaties, and for injunctions against the improper enforcement of
treaties.
2. The Executive as Representative of Public Interests
Penal actions aside, Mexican law frequently bestows on
organs of the Executive the duty to represent public, national, or
social interests before the courts. The Republic's Attorney
General has the mandate to intervene, among others, in
unconstitutionality actions, and also has powers that include
requesting the Supreme Court to hear questions of federal
interest and supremacy. 19
In addition to plaintiffs, governmental defendants, and
interested third parties, federal attorneys intervene in amparo
trials to represent the social interests in the litigation. 120 As the
social representative in litigation, the Executive must safeguard

116.

See C.P.D.F., art. 6, D.O., Aug. 14, 1931.

117.

See id. arts. 2-5.
See MEX. CoNsr. art. 107, § XVI, as amended Ley de Amparo, arts.

118.

204-10.
119. See MEx. CoNsT. art. 102, § A; Ley Orgdnica de la Procuraduria
General de la Repfiblica, art. 4, D.O., May 10, 1996 [hereinafter Ley Orgdnica de

la P.G.R.].
120.

See Ley de Amparo, art. 5.
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the principle of legality, the proper administration of justice, and
the respect of human rights. 121 In this role, the Executive may
raise questions of international law to the extent they relate to

ensuring the preceding interests.
Some cases, however, immediately entail the responsibility to
raise questions of international law.
Regarding federal
jurisdiction over controversies involving consular and diplomatic
agents, it is the Mexican Supreme Court's long-standing view that
[aiccording to [Slection VI of [A]rticle 104 of the Constitution
["Federal tribunals shall have cognizance... Of cases concerning
members of the Consular and Diplomatic Corps"], it Is for federal
tribunals to take cognizance of cases concerning the members of
the diplomatic and consular corps and since that provision does
not distinguish between the members of the Mexican consular and
diplomatic corps abroad, and those of foreign governments In the
country, this legal provision must be deemed to encompass the
former and the latter; and even if the acts executed by such
individuals have a private character, the federal authorities must
have cognizance of them because given their consular or diplomatic
12 2
status they may affect international relations.

Not surprisingly, the Attorney General of the Republic is
expressly mandated to intervene in controversies involving
diplomats and consuls. 123 In federal legislation, the mandate
specifically refers to whether there is immunity in criminal
cases.124 Although statutory law apparently circumscribes the
Attorney General's role in controversies involving consuls and
diplomats acting precisely as such, 125 the Supreme Court's
precedent directly interprets the Constitution.
The federal
judiciary cannot waive its jurisdiction beyond official acts, nor is
it necessarily bound to follow the Executive's view on immunity
under treaties or international law.

121. See Ley Orgdnica de la P.G.R., art. 2.
122. See "Dplomdtcos y Cdnsules," Vol. VII at 654, reprintedin 7 DEREcHOS
DEL PUEBLO MExcANo, supranote 3, at 977-78.
123. See Ley Orgdnica de la P.G.R., art. 7, § IV.
124. See Id.; see also Ley Orgdnica del Poder Judicial, art. 50, § I(c)
(jurisdiction of federal trial courts over crimes "committed abroad by diplomatic
agents, official staff of the legations of the Republic and Mexican consuls"); d. §
I(d) (jurisdiction of federal courts over crimes "committed in foreign embassies
and legations"); [Vienna] Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, arts.
40-45. D.O., Dec. 19, 1968 (adopted by Mexico Sept. 11, 1968); [Vienna]
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, arts. 29-32, D.O., Sept. 14,
1965 (adopted by Mexico Aug. 3, 1965).
125. See Ley Orgdnica de la P.G.R., art. 7, § IV.
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3. The Executive as Assistant of the Judiciary
The belief that the Executive should primarily assist the
Judiciary in international litigation is one deeply rooted in
Mexican legal culture. Direct resort to constables, solicitors, or
huissiers, which are more general judicial methods for the
performance of judicial proceedings abroad, are uncommon in
Mexican practice.

For judicial proceedings abroad, recourse to the Mexican
Foreign Service is the standard method. 12 6 Before Mexican

courts, and on behalf of them, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or
the Office of the Republic's Attorney General acts as the central or
coordinating authority. 12 7 Again, questions of international law

fall within this capacity, to the extent they directly relate to the
functions of central authorities as such.
Occasionally, the registrars of superior tribunals function as
central authorities, both in common and civil law venues, and one
inter-American trend is to allow the designation of specific-unit
authorities in federal States. 128
Although not technically
inconceivable, the designation of local supreme tribunals as
central authorities sounds remote and foreign to the Mexican
tradition.

126. See Ley del Servicio Exterior Mexicano, art. 44, § IV; C.F.P.C., arts. 548
& 551.
127. See, e.g., Additional Protocol to the Inter-American Convention on the
Taking of Evidence Abroad, May 24, 1984, art. 7, 24 I.L.M. 459, 472; InterAmerican Treaties: Signatures, Ratifications, and Deposits with Explanatory
Notes, 9 OA.S.T.S. Rev. 1993 at B-51 (declaration of Mexico within article 7
[designation of Ministry of Foreign Affairs as Central Authority]); Treaty on
Cooperation Between the U.SA. and the United Mexican States for Mutual Legal
Assistance, Dec. 9, 1987, U.S.-Mex., art. 2, 27 I.L.M. 443; D.O., Aug. 7, 1991
(designating the Attorney General of the Republic's Office as Coordinating
Authority).
128. See Inter-American Convention on International Traffic n Minors, Mar.
18, 1994, art. 5, OEA/Ser.K/XXI.5, CIDIP-V/doc.36/94 rev. 5, 79 OA.S.T.S., 33
I.L.M. 721 (1994) ("A federal State, or a State in which several legal systems
apply, or a State with autonomous territorial units may designate more than one
Central Authority, specifying the legal or territorial area covered by each of
them"); HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRrvATE IWTERNATONAL LAW, PRACnCAL HANDBOOK ON
THE OPERATION OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 15 NOVEMBER 1965 ON THE SERVICE

ABROAD OF JuDICIAL AND EXrRawuIcIAL DocUMENTS IN Crvn OR COMMERCIAL
MATrERS 52-110 (2d ed. 1992) (indicating the States parties that have designated
judicial authorities as central authorities are the following: Barbados [designation
of Registrar of the Supreme Court], Canada [designation of federal, provincial and
territorial central authorities], Germany [designation of individual central
authorities for each constituent unit], Italy [designation of the Registry of the
Court of Appeal in Rome], Malawi [Registar of the High Court], Seychelles
[Registrar of the Supreme Court], U.K. [designation of central authority and of
registrars and courts as "other authorities" for specific territorial units]).
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To strengthen the cooperation between the executive and
judicial branches in
international legal assistance, the
designation of local agencies as specific-unit central authorities
seems more suitable. Within Mexico's federal organization, these
alternatives deserve particular consideration regarding treaties on
judicial assistance in civil or family matters, the performance of
which heavily depends on state laws and tribunals.
4. Judicial Opinions to the Executive
In Mexican extradition law, the distribution of power between
the Judiciary and the Executive presents strikingly unique

features.

While federal trial judges intervene in extraditions

requested by foreign states, the Executive initially decides the
case, and constitutional control shifts to higher courts. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers whether the extradition
request should be admitted, 129 while federal district judges
30
consider detentions, evidence, hearings, defenses, and batl.1
The Office of the Republic's Attorney General must appear before
13 1
the judge.
Collegiate circuit tribunals have jurisdiction over writs of
amparo against
the
Executive's
resolutions
granting
extradition. 13 2
Because the proscription of treaties for the
133
extradition of political prisoners is a constitutional guarantee,
the issue of whether it bars granting concrete requests is suitable
for amparo review.
However, district judges give judicial opinions to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs concerning the merits of the request itself,
either under applicable treaties or, in their absence, under the
Extradition Act. 134 The outcome of each opinion-in other words
the resolution as to whether to grant the extradition-is the
135
responsibility of the Executive, not of the trial judge.

129.
130.
131.

See Ley de Extradici6n Intemacional, art. 20, D.O., Dec. 29, 1975.
See id. arts. 21-27.
See &d.arts. 21, 25.

132. See Ley Orgdnica del Poder Judicial, art. 37, § IV.
133. See MEx. CoNsr. art. 15.
134. See Ley de Extradici6n Intemacional, arts. 28-33. For Information on
the extradition procedure, see INsTuro DE ESPEciAuzACI5N JUMIcIAL DE IA
SUPREMA CoRTE DE JuscIc DE IA NACI6N, supranote 109, at 333-63.
135. For information on this issue, see Acuerdo del Tribunal Pleno de la
Suprema Corte de Justicta de la Nact6n, Exp. 3/96, Promovente: Presidente de la
Repfiblica 141-42 (Apr. 23, 1996) (Supreme Court's investigation, carried out at
the request of the President, about facts constituting serious violations of
constitutional guarantees). For information on the constitutional foundations of
and Issues of standing n the investigation, see infra text accompanying notes
197-204, 210-11.
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In international extraditions, foreign relations concerns
initially weigh the balance toward the Executive, with the
constitutional review of high courts establishing the final
equilibrium between both branches.
Legal cooperation and
international undertakings receive, in short, as much
consideration as public policy and the respect of fundamental

rights allow.
B. Emerging Issues

Several developments surprisingly depart from the traditional
relationship between Mexico's Judicial and Executive branches in
international legal questions: the proliferation of alternate dispute
settlement means, free trade-related due process undertakings,
the distribution of power under blocking statutes, and the
implications of the new Supreme Court's powers in respect to
denunciations and reservations.
1. Alternate Means
Quasi-judicial procedures and other alternate means are
increasingly available to settle treaty-related disputes and to give
13 6
effect to international undertakings in Mexico. Conciliation,
precautionary orders, 13 7 ombudsmen's recommendations, 138
administrative inquiries,13 9 the extrajudicial payment of
damages,' 40 and the administrative invalidation or nonexecution
of public acts 14 1 are noteworthy in this regard.
Although the Mexican judicial system has been remarkably
strengthened in recent years, one prominent way that
international human rights law has achieved concrete domestic
results is through recommendations from outside the judiciary.
Mexico's National Human Rights Commission constantly relies on
international standards, whether embodied in conventions or not,

136. See, e.g., Ley de la C.N.D.H., art 5(VI.
137. See, e.g., Ley Federal de Procedimiento Administrativo, arts. 81, 82;
Reglamento de la C.N.D.H., art. 99.
138. See, e.g., Ley de la C.N.D.H., arts. 22-26. For example, the Agrarian
Affairs Federal Attorney and the Environmental Protection Federal Attorney,
Mexico now has an ombudsmen network consisting of 32 public human rights

commissions: one with national reach and one in every constituent unit. See
MEX. CoNsT., amended by D.O., Jan. 28, 1992, art. 102(B).

139.

See Ley Federal de Responsabflidades de los Servidores Pdiblicos, arts.

46-78, D.O., Dec. 31, 1982.

140.

See, e.g., C. Rodriguez Moreno, Reparactdn del Dafo por Parte del

EstadoporVolactones aDerechosHumanos, Oct. 1994, Gaceta, at 11-14.

141.

See Ley Federal de Procedimiento Administrativo, art. 6.
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in its recommendations to organs of the Executive and other

agencies.

14 2

That these recommendations are not binding Is less
important than the fact that authorities habitually accept and
comply with most of them. 143 But the Mexican ombudsmen have
no powers to intervene in jurisdictional matters. 144 They do not
substitute for the Judiciary's constitutional
control of
governmental compliance with human rights treaties, nor should

the Judiciary surrender such control to other organs.
2. The Ancillary Labor and Environmental Agreements

North American free trade has highlighted secondary issues
that pertain to the distribution of power between the Judiciary
and the Executive. Ancillary provisions of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (hereinafter NAFTA) specify due process
standards in the sphere of judicial, administrative, and quasijudicial litigation in labor and environmental matters 145 and

142. See, e.g., C.N.D.H. Recomendaci6n 8/96, Feb. 2, 1996, Case of LARC
& JCDF,Feb. 1996, Gaceta, at 29, 37 (1996) (considering, in light of the U.N.
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners and the U.N. Principles
for the Protection of All Detained Persons, that temporary isolation may be
deemed constitutional "only if it is imposed as a punishment with strict
observance of the guarantees of legality-that both the infraction and the
intensity and duration of the punishment be foreseen in the [Readaptation
Center's] Regulations-and of proportionality-that the period of the punishment
corresponds to the seriousness of the offense"); C.N.D.H. Recomendaci6n 259/93,
Dec. 22, 1993, Case of the Social Readaptatlon Center of Tampico, Tamaulipas,
Gaceta, at 162, 169 (finding overcrowding, lack of medical and criminological
classification, and lack of segregation of accused from convicted persons in
violation of the same U.N. Rules and Principles); C.N.D.H. Recomendacl6n
137/95. Nov. 14, 1995, Nov. 1995, Gaceta at 229, 245 (finding acts of torture, as
defined in the U.N. and Inter-American Conventions on the subject): C.N.D.H.
Recomendaci6n 205/93, Oct. 13, 1993, Case of the mentally-ill and the
incompetent held in the Social Readaptation Centers of the State of Colima, Dec.
1993, Gaceta at 62, 74 (finding violations of the U.N. Minimum Rules for
Treatment of Prisoners, Declaration on the Rights of the Mentally Disabled and
Principles for the Protection of Detained Persons).
143. See, e.g., C.N.D.H., ANNUAL REPOIR
336-37 (1993) (221
recommendations accepted, with evidence of full compliance;
297
recommendations accepted, with evidence of partial compliance; nine
recommendations not accepted; six recommendation accepted, within the period
to submit evidence; two recommendations accepted, with unsatisfactory
compliance;
18 recommendations "on time to be answered"; three
recommendations accepted, "without evidence of compliance").
144. See MEx. CONST., as amended, art 102(B).
145. See North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 13, 1993,
Can.-Mex.-U.S., arts. 4 & 5, D.O., Dec. 21, 1993; North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., arts. 6 & 7, D.O.,
Dec. 21, 1993. For a U.S. view on the subject, see Stephen Zamora, The
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provide for the decision and review of such cases by impartial,
14 6
independent tribunals.
Their designation notwithstanding, the ancillary agreements
are not nter-nstitutional agreements without national status in
the Mexican order. 147 Still, they do not seek direct domestic
application, but rather the development of measures to enforce
national norms and standards. 14 8 The question thus follows:
how can the Executive encourage performance of ancillary
agreements by labor and other tribunals while assuring due
respect for judicial independence?
In Mexico, available options include giving effect to the

ancillary agreements through both national laws and human
rights instruments. Unlike U.S. courts, Mexican courts are not
barred by reservations, understandings, or declarations
(hereinafter RUDs) from directly applying treaties on civil and
political rights as self-executing law. 14 9
If necessary, the
competent executive agencies may seek the performance of the
due process undertakings by raising overlapping international
150
treaties before the courts.

Americanzatton of Mexican Law: Non-Trade Issues in the North American Free
TradeAgreement, 24 LAw& POLV IN'LBuS. 391 (1993).
146. See, e.g., North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, supra note
145, art. 5(4).
147. See supratext accompanying notes 26-27.
148. See, e.g., North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, supranote
145, arts. 2 & 3.
149. For information on the U.S. "non-self-executing" declaration to the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, see, e.g., David P. Stewart, U.S. Ratijiation
of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The Significance of Reservations,
Understandingsand Declaratons,14 HuM. Rrs. L.J. 77, 79 (1993).
150. Compare, e.g., North American Agreement in Labor Cooperation, supra
note 145, art. 5 (undertaking to ensure due process, including public hearings,
right to defense, reasonable time frameworks, right to appeal, impartial and
independent review, effective remedies, and legal assistance), uith Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, supranote 86, art. 2(3) (basic undertakings, including
effective remedies before "judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or
before] any other competent authorities"), and d. art. 14(1) (right of every person,
"[iun the determination... of his rights and obligations in a suit at law ... to a
fair trial and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal
established by the law"), andAmerican Convention on Human Rights, supra note
73, art. 8, 1 (every person's right "to a hearing, with due guarantees and within
a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal,
previously established by law . . . for the determination of his rights and
obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature") (emphasis added), and fd.
art. 25,
1 (right of everyone "to simple and prompt recourse, or any other
effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that
violate his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the state
concerned or by this Convention."). See also Exceptions to the Exhaustion of
Domestic Remedies, Advisory Opinion OC-11/90, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 11 (Ser. A),
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The means a State chooses to carry out international
agreements on the national level is essentially a domestic law
issue. Without prejudice of other measures, this method seems
consistent with judicial independence, with Mexico's monist
system, and with the purposes of the ancillary and other
agreements.
3. The Executive's Advisory Role Under Blocking Statutes
Another significant development is the Law Protecting Trade
and Investment, 1 5 1 (hereinafter LPTI) which was enacted to block
the Helms-Burton Act.15 2 The law gives the Executive the role of
advising the interested business community. The LPTI authorizes
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Trade "to issue
general criteria for the interpretation of this Law."1 5 3 Similarly, it
directs both ministries "to advise affected individuals and
15 4
corporations."
Coupled with the Executive's interpretive authority, advice to
the interested parties prospectively encompasses questions of
international law that might arise before Mexican courts within
the blocking statute. 155 Therefore, the LPTI represents an original
model for Executive-Judiciary relations in questions of
international law touching vital national interests. As a matter of
judicial independence, the resulting question is whether the
courts should defer to the Executive in these circumstances.
4. The Judiciary, Denunciations, and Reservations
At present, it is an open question as to how the Executive
should proceed if, in the exercise of its new powers, the Judiciary
invalidates a treaty in the Mexican legal order. If the Supreme
24-28 (1990) (discussing the right to legal representation within the right to a fair
hearing both in criminal and in civil, labor and other matters).
151. Ley de Proteccidn al Comerco y law Inversi6n de Normas Extranjeras
que Contravengan el Derecho Intemacional, D.O., Oct. 23, 1996 [hereinafter Ley
de Proteccidn al Comerclo y la Inversi6n].

152.

Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6021 (1996).

153.
154.

See Ley de Protecci6n al Comercio y la Inversin, art. 8.
See c art. 7.

155. The LPTI commands Mexican courts to deny recognition and
enforcement of judgments, judicial orders, and arbitral awards resulting from
foreign laws containing objectives specified in the law. Mexican courts could
enforce foreign monetary judgments and awards against parties who gained

economic benefits from foreign judgments and awards resulting from the same
foreign laws. Parties connected to Mexico and condemned to damages pursuant
to such foreign laws would get a right of action in Mexican courts.
Protecci6n al Comercio y la Inversi6n, arts. 1 & 4-6.

See Ley de
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Court of Mexico only strikes down specific provisions of a treaty
as unconstitutional, international altematives include proposing
suitable amendments to it. 15 6 In contrast, if the Supreme Court
totally invalidates the treaty, denunciation or withdrawal should
15 7
immediately follow.
As far as separation of powers is concerned, one potential
problem is that Mexican law contemplates no specific procedure
for the denunciation of treaties.15 8 Because the Senate has the
exclusive power to approve ratification, acceptance, or
adherence, 159 constitutional controversies might arise over
whether this implies the exclusive power to approve denunciation
or withdrawal. In comparative law, solutions include express
constitutional
provisions
governing the denunciation
of

treaties. 160
Also, while understandings are not standard Mexican
practice, Mexican reservations and declarations (hereinafter
REDs) to international treaties now seem more prone to the
Supreme Court's constitutional review. That REDs fall within the
Executive's and the Senate's domain clearly follows from the
treaty-making powers of both organs. 16 1 Yet, the review of REDs
seems inherent in the subject matter of unconstitutionality
actions, which resolve "the possible contradiction between a
1 62
general norm and [the] Constitution."
"Reservation" means "a unilateral statement, however . . .
named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting,
approving or acceding to a treaty... [that] purport[s] to exclude
or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in
their application to that State." 16 3 Domestically, treaties

156.

See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supranote 36, arts. 39-

157.
158.

See icl.art. 56.
See Ley sobre la Celebracidn de Tratados, arts. 1-5.

159.

See MEx. CONST. art. 76, § I; Ley sobre la Celebraci6n de Tratados.

41.

arts. 4 & 5.
160. See ARGEN. CoNsr. art. 75, § 22 (establishing the legislative power "to

approve and reject treaties," requiring a two-thirds approval "of the total of
members of each Chamber" for the Executive's denunciation of human rights
treaties); td. § 23 (requiring approval by "an absolute majority of the total of

members of each Chamber" for the denunciation of economic integration treaties).
161. See, e.g., Josd L4pez Portillo, Exposildn del Poder EJecutivo de la Uni6n
sobre los Pactosy Convencones Intenaclonalesque Promueven la Proteccid6n de los
Derechos Humanos, fn Los TRATADOS SoBRE DERECHOS HUMANOS YIA LEGIsLAcI6N
MFxmCANA supra note 4, at 79-94 (Executive's submission of seven instruments
and the proposed REDs for Senate approval).
162. See MEx. CoNsr. art. 105, § II, as amended.
163. Vienna Convention on the Law Treaties, supranote 36, art. 2, § 1, d.
Mexican law defines "reservation" as "[tlhe declaration formulated at the time of
signing, ratifying or acceding to a treaty, with the purpose of excluding or
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concluded by Mexico integrate reservations and declarations
having the same result. Once published with the treaty they
modify, REDs become, in effect, "general norms" in force in the
Republic. 1 64 REDs in possible contradiction with the Constitution
may fall, then, within the subject matter of claims of
unconstitutionality.

V.

STANDING TO RAISE QUESFIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BEFORE

MEXICAN COURTS
A. The Law and Precedent
With few exceptions, Mexican law grants no actio
popularis; 165 nor does it contemplate, in general, specific standing
to raise questions of international law before the courts and
tribunals of justice. Rather, the norms of standing common to
each domestic action apply. As a rule, only directly injured
parties, parties having the contrary interest, and their
16 6
representatives have standing.
Criminal matters aside, several situations present peculiar
features concerning treaty-related questions: standing in the writ
of amparo, standing in claims of unconstitutionality and
constitutional controversies, and the distinction between the right
of petition and constitutional standing.
1. Amparo Standing
Highly developed in matters of standing, the Mexican law of
amparo still regards treaties as more likely to encroach upon
constitutional guarantees than to foster their observance and
enjoyment. Despite this traditional approach, under certain
circumstances the interested parties may benefit from amparo
standing to assert rights under international treaties.

modifying the juridical effects of certain provisions of the treaty in its application
to the United Mexican States." Mexican law does not establish, however, any

particular procedure for approving or withdrawing reservations. See Ley sobre la
Celebraci6n de Tratados, art. 2, § VII; JEsus RODRIGUEZ Y RODRIGUEZ, LAS
RESERVAS

FORMULADAS

POR

MXICO A

INSTRUMENTOs

INTERNACIoNALES

SOBRE

DERECHOS HUMANOS 29 (1996).
164. See supra text accompanying note 16.
165. One exception confirming the rule Is the impeachment procedure. See
Ley Federal de Responsabilidades de los Servidores Publicos, art. 12.
166.

See, e.g., C.P.C.D.F., art. 1.
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First, only parties or their representatives directly injured by
a treaty, law, or act have standing to request amparo
injunctions. 167 Implied in this rule is the standing to seek
protection against laws or acts contradicting treaties if the laws or
acts simultaneously injure an individual's constitutional
guarantees.' 6 8 Mexican law does not accord amparo standing on
the sole ground that a law or act may contradict supreme
treaties. 169 However, the affected parties have amparo standing if
they show domestic laws or acts contradicting a supreme treaty
injure due process and legality or other constitutional
70
guarantees.1
Second, plaintiffs seeking protection against a norm or treaty
must show a concrete application injuring them or that the
17 1
norm's entry into force Immediately injures their interests.
Absent imminent threat to personal security, there is no
immediate amparo standing against laws that allow, but do not
compel, public acts that potentially contradict treaties.

Unless the laws do not require regulations or other
successive measures for their execution, the case for immediate
amparo standing is hard to build. In contrast, amparo standing is
assured when the law instantly imposes legal obligations in
possible contradiction with treaties (e.g., compulsory professional
association or new requirements affecting the exercise of treatybased freedoms).
Third, district attorneys have standing to challenge amnparo
rulings injuring interests of the State as such. 17 2 Injunctions
against treaties, their enforcement, and treaty-based acts
naturally present issues of public interest.
Finally, the Republic's Attorney General, like the parties and
judges in each case, has standing to request the high courts to

167.

See Ley de Amparo, art. 4.

168. Despite occasional comment to the contrary, there is general
agreement that the contradiction of treaties per se does not grant standing to
exercise the writ of amparo. See, e.g., Bdez, supranote 4, at 27-28.
169.

See, e.g., ROMERO & PnmENTEL, supranote 67, at 33 ("The writ of amparo

was established... not to protect the Constitution as a whole, but to protect the
individual guarantees .... Had the constitutional framers intended to grant the
standing to request amparofor the protection of any violation of the Constitution,
even If it did not result in an injury to the individual's interest, they would have
clearly established so, but they did not ... [The framers] did not intend to give the
Federal Judiciary absolute powers to oppose any [ulnconstitutional provisions
through the writ of amparo[;] instead they intended to establish this writ only for
the protection and enjoyment of individual guarantees.").
170.
171.

See supranotes 104-07 and accompanying text.
See ROMERO & PIMENTEL, supranote 67, at 72-73, 411-12; see also Ley

de Amparo, art. 73, §§ V-VI.
172. See, e.g., ROMERO &PImEL, supra note 67, at 75.
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resolve contradictory amparo rulings. 17 3
This includes
contradictory rulings about the constitutionality, application, or
interpretation of treaties.
2. Claims of Unconstitutionality
With at least eight affirmative votes from its eleven Justices,
the Supreme Court of Mexico has the power to invalidate norms
contradicting the Constitution.17 4
Since acciones de
inconstituconalidad (hereinafter claims of unconstitutionality)
focus heavily on dissenting legislative minorities, the standing to
exercise them is narrow.
Standing to bring claims of unconstitutionality of
"international treaties concluded by the Mexican State" is
reserved to thirty-three percent of the Senate's members and to
the Republic's Attorney General. 175 The same percentage of
senators and the Attorney General have standing to claim the

unconstitutionality of federal laws and of laws of the Federal
District. 17 6 Additionally, the Attorney General, appointed with
legislative approval, has standing to exercise actions against laws
1 77
of the Mexican states.
Thirty-three percent of national representatives has standing
to challenge federal or Federal-District laws. 17 8 The same
percentage of state or Federal-District representatives has
standing to challenge laws enacted in their own jurisdictions. 179
Political parties have standing in constitutional challenges in
18 0
electoral cases.
The reason senators, and not representatives, have standing
against treaties is that the treaties' approval is decided by the
Senate, not by both Chambers of Congress.' 8 ' As for the
analogous standing of the Attorney General, though technically
within the Executive branch, here he represents the public
interests and society as a whole.' 82 In constitutional challenges
and constitutional controversies, the President acts through

173.

See Ley de Amparo, arts. 197 & 197(A).

174. See MEX. CONST. art. 105, § H1,as amended.
175. See id. art. 105, §§ I1(b) & 11(c).
176. See iL
177. See &Lart. 105, §11(c).
178. See Id. art. 105, § II(a).
179. See d. art. 105, §§ 11(d) &11(e).
180. See I art. 105, § II(O) (specifying that the actions challenging
constitutionality represent the only way to request the invalidation of local and
federal electoral norms).
181. See t. art. 76, § I.
182. See supratext accompanying notes 119-21.
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cabinet members or through the Judicial Advisor to the Federal
18 3
Government, not through the Attorney General.
Ratione materiae,there is hardly any doubt that the Supreme
Court can invalidate general norms that contradict the
constitutional supremacy clause and, therefore, the treaties
incorporated by it. The regulatory legislation makes it clear that
constitutional challenges and constitutional controversies leave
room for affirming the violation of any "constitutional precept"
and for any "invalid [unconstitutionality] reasoning." 184 In claims
of unconstitutionality, the Supreme Court is bound "to correct
any errors appearing in the citation of... legal precepts" and to
"rectify [the] reasoning." 18 5 Ultimately, the Court has express

authority to "support [the] declaration of unconstitutionality in
any constitutional
precept, whether invoked or not in the initial
6
brief."18
Ratione personae, the question follows as to who has
standing to claim the unconstitutionality of federal or local laws
contradicting treaties within the constitutional supremacy clause.
Legislative minorities presumably have standing regarding laws
enacted in their own spheres. But because the Attorney General
has standing against federal and local laws generally, the
Constitution seems to give him broader powers to assert the
supremacy of treaties.
3. Constitutional Controversies
Different branches within the three levels of government
(federal, state, and municipal) have standing to request the
Supreme Court to settle constitutional controversies arising
between the branches. 18 7 As it happens in constitutional
challenges,
in constitutional controversies
the
judicial
18 8
invalidation of norms requires eight affirmative votes.

183. See Ley Reglamentaria de las Fracciones I y 11 del Articulo 105 de la
Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, arts. 11 & 63, D.O., May
11, 1995.
184. See i- art. 22, §§ 5 & 6; id art. 61, §§ 4 & 5.
185. See 0. art. 71.
186. See td. For the rules regarding rectification of technicalities that apply
in constitutional controversies, see Id. arts. 39 & 40. For background on this
higher form of rectification of technicalities, see supra notes 108-09 and
accompanying text.
187. See MEx. CONST. art. 105, § I, as amendecL Unlike actions challenging
constitutionality, constitutional controversies were established but not regulated,
except for taxation controversies, before the 1994 amendments. See Soberanes,
supranote 98, at 27-29.
188. See MEx. CONsT. art. 105, § I. as amended.
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Controversies between "two branches of the same State,
about the constitutionality of their acts or general norms" are
cognizable.18 9 Besides treaty primacy in concrete cases, local
supreme tribunals or governors now may seek the invalidation of
norms enacted by their own state's Congress that possibly
contradict constitutional treaties.
The Supreme Court also is able to resolve constitutional
controversies between "[t]he Federation and one State or the
Federal District," 190 and between "[t]he Federation and one
Municipality." 19 1 Controversies about the constitutionality of

international agreements

concluded

by state or municipal

agencies may fall within these grants.19 2 Although the Supreme

19 3
Court apparently has no power to invalidate such agreements,
the issue is not crucial as a matter of domestic law. After all,
unlike treaties, the Mexican legal order does not incorporate interinstitutional agreements.
Moreover, if state or municipal agreements encroaching on
the federal domain simultaneously encroach upon constitutional
guarantees, the affected individuals have amparo standing against
the agreements.' 9 4 The same is true of federal agreements
encroaching on the local spheres of government. 19 5 This is not
because inter-institutional agreements have domestic normative
status. Rather, should the execution of such agreements produce
injuries to an individual's constitutional guarantees, the courts
19 6
can adjudicate them as acts of authority.

4. Standing and Right of Petition
Mexico's highest court has the power to designate justices,
magistrates, judges, or special commissioners for the exclusive
purpose of investigating "facts constituting the serious violation of
an individual guarantee." 19 7

Obvious as the connections to

human rights treaties are, the Supreme Court has been emphatic
that this power is different in scope and purpose from the writ of
amparo. 19 8 In one exceptionally rare inquiry, the Court spelled
out the applicable criteria, including "a state of alarm extending
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See id. art. 105, § I(h).
See fd. art. 105, § I(a).
See id. art. 105, § I(b).
See supratext accompanying notes 26-27, 36-37.
See MEX. CONST. art. 105, § I as amended.

194.
195.

See Id. art. 103, § I; Ley de Amparo, art. 1, § IHI.
See MEx CONS?. art. 103, § II; Ley de Amparo, art. 1, § II.

196.

For judicial criteria about who has authority and what Is an act of

authority for amparopurposes, see ROMERO & PIMENTEL, supranote 67, at 4-32.
197. See Msx. CoNsr. art 97.
198.
See Acuerdo del TribunalPleno,Exp. 3/96, supranote 135, at 36-45.
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into time," "generalized violations... in a place, State, or region,"
and the inability "to control them, in a reasonable time." 199
In these situations, the Supreme Court has the power to act
on its own initiative. 200 But only the Federal Executive, each
chamber of the national Congress, and state governors have
constitutional standing to request the Court to do S0.201
Private parties may urge the exercise of this power on the
ground that human rights treaties are at stake. Unlike the writ of
amparo, in which private parties have standing, such requests fall
within the constitutional right of petition. 20 2 Under Mexican law,
the right of petition essentially commands the addressed
authority to answer promptly in writing respectful, peaceful,
written requests. 20 3 Beyond that, Mexican jurisprudence affirms
that the right of petition alone does
not command the authority to
20 4
give a reply granting the request.
B. PossibleAdjustments
According to Josd Luis Soberanes Fernandez, "the most
controverted feature of [constitutional challenges] is the restricted
number of persons with standing to bring [them]." 205 In the
words of Soberanes, the Attorney General's standing to challenge
treaties "is somewhat awkward because international treaties are
concluded by the President... who is the hierarchical superior of
the Attorney, hence one can hardly understand
how the
subordinate challenges the acts of his superior."20 6
In claims of unconstitutionality and in constitutional
controversies, amendments making express the implied standing
to raise the incompatibility of domestic norms with supreme
treaties seem unlikely today. These actions and controversies
represent exceptional developments in progress. Whether their
potential will be fully realized in practice remains to be seen.
Eventually, however, some possible adjustments will merit
deliberation: whether to grant individuals, bar associations, and
other private parties standing to raise constitutional
challenges; 207 whether to grant Mexico's National Human Rights
199.

See Id. at 40-43.

200.
201.
202.

See MEx. CoNsT. art. 97.
See id.
See CARPIZO, supra note 23, at 210.
See MEx. CoNsr. art. 8.

203.
204.

205.

See RODRIGUEZY RODRIGUEZ, supranote 105, at 61.

See Soberanes, supranote 98, at 27.

206. See id.
207. See Fix-ZAMuDIo, supra note 34, at 351 (noting the Colombian and
Venezuelan "popular challenges to constitutionality" grant such standing to
individuals).
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Commission standing to raise the possible contradiction between
general norms and international treaties; 20 8 and whether specific
organs other than the plaintiff, the defendant, and the Attorney
General should participate in raising contradictions between
20 9
treaties and the Constitution, and between laws and treaties.
The Mexican Supreme Court's power to investigate serious
human rights violations could become the subject of regulatory
legislation.2 10 Today, absent such regulatory norms, the effects of
the Court's findings are deemed as influential, but not as
binding. 2 1 1
Eventually, regulatory legislation could specify
whether and to what extent the findings should bind other
government organs and branches.
It could also specify the
Court's power to consider human rights treaties in its inquiries

and to hear evidence on this subject.

Ideally, the National

Human Rights Commission should have constitutional standing
before the Court.
For individuals and other private parties, the writ of amparo
remains, nevertheless, the paramount remedy in the Mexican
constitutional system. It seems worthwhile to make express their
implied amparo standing against norms or acts that violate
supreme human rights treaties. While not every internationallyrecognized human right is susceptible to adjudication, many are.
Moreover, while many internationally recognized human rights
that are susceptible to adjudication parallel the Mexican
constitutional guarantees, this is not always the case. The matter
warrants careful study.

208. See Ley de la C.N.D.H., art. 6, § VIII (Commission's power to propose
actions for "better protection of human rights"): id. § XIII (Commission's power to
propose actions "advancing the fulfillment within the national territory of treaties,
conventions and agreements signed and ratified by Mexico in the human rights
field").

209.

See, e.g., Ley Orgdnca de la Administracl6n Phblica Federal, art. 28(1),

D.O., Dec. 29, 1976, amended by D.O., Dec. 28, 1994 (intervention of Ministry of

Foreign Affairs "in all sorts of treaties, agreements and conventions," by advising
and coordinating federal agencies in this regard); Ley Reglamentaria de las
Fracciones I y II del Artfculo 105 de la Constituci6n, art. 10 (giving the status of
"interested third parties" in constitutional controversies to certain entities,
powers, or organs that, "without having the character of plaintiffs or defendants,
could be affected by the judgment").
210.
See CARPizo, supranote 23, at 199-217.

211.

See t at 213-16.

1997]

ITERNATIONAL
)
LAWIN MEXICAN COURTS

1075

VI. ENSURING ASSISTANCE TO MEXICAN COURTS IN THE APPLICATION OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW

Because duly-concluded treaties are part of Mexican law,
their existence, content, and incorporation are not subject to
proof before Mexican courts. Once a treaty gains domestic force,
only the treaty's interpretation or applicability to the matter
before the court is susceptible to controversy, provided the treaty
conforms to the Constitution.
In contrast, like foreign norms, usage or custom that
212
generates law is subject to dispute by the interested parties.

Occasionally the courts have held that "[tihe law is subject to
proof when it consists of the jurisprudence of tribunals" and that
the burden of proof corresponds to the party "that asserts it and
invokes it."2 13 Parties invoking international sources other than
treaties should adequately document them, for the domestic
effects of such sources are particularly prone to dispute.
Amicus curiae briefs are foreign to Mexican law and practice.
Despite their utility in international legal questions,
apprehensions of politicizing the judicial process might hinder
their eventual introduction into the Mexican judicial system.
Other ways of assisting Mexican courts in the application of
international law include dissemination, rules of evidence, and
domestic codification.
A. Dissemination
The foremost way of assisting national judges in the
application of international law is by making the sources of
international law directly available to them. Public agencies,
international organizations, and academic institutions all
continue to engage in this process.
As in other countries, there is an official, annual collection of
treaties and agreements in Mexico. 2 14 The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs publishes an annual index including the date of domestic
publication, status of ratifications, reservations and declarations,
objections, and inter-institutional agreements. 2 15
Ideally, all
Mexican tribunals should have immediate access to the texts and
updated index. Also, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides

212.

See C.F.P.C. art. 86.

213. 109 S.J.F. at 286 (5a ep6ca).
214. TRATADOS RATFIcmAos Y CoNVENIos EJEcurivos CELEBRADOS POR
MEXIco (for treaties before 1992); TRATADOS CELEBRADOS POR MEXICO (for treaties

after 1992).
215. Mbxco: RELACI6N DETRATADOS EN VIGOR.
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public information services about the status of treaties. Every
federal court and local tribunal should be aware of these services.
In the Organization of American States (hereinafter OAS), one
Resolution of the General Assembly instructs the Permanent
Council,
through its Working Group on Enhancement of the
Administration of Justice... and in conjunction with the InterAmerican Juridical Committee, to take the necessary steps to
increase awareness and disseminate information in the member
states concerning the international rules of law emanating from the
inter-American system and, In particular, from the instruments for
2 16
which the OAS General Secretariat is depositary.

In addition to the works in progress to further disseminate inter-

American judicial sources by electronic means, specialized
seminars are available at the request of interested Member
States.2 17
As for inter-American human rights case law,
2 19
repertories are either in progress 2 18 or already available.
Similar plans for the dissemination of U.N.-sponsored law could
significantly assist national judges in the application of
220
international law.

B. Rules of Evidence
In civil matters, Mexican courts apply foreign law as judges in
the country of origin would, but the parties can dispute the
existence and content of that law. 2 2 1 Consequently, Mexican
judges have broad authority to order or admit such proof as they
deem necessary to establish the text, force, sense, and scope of

216.

See Enhancement of the Administrationof Justice in the Americas, OAS

GAOR, AG/RES. 1325 (XXV-0/95), June 9, 1995, "Resolves" para. 2.

217.

See Support for the Administration of Justice in the Americas, OAS

GAOR, AG/RES. 1326 (XXV-0/95), June 9, 1995.
218. See CENTRO DE DERECHOS HuMNos Y DERECHO INTERNACIONAL
HUMANITArIO, WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAw, AMERICAN UNvERsrry, PRoYECro PARA
IA CRFACI6N DE UN REPERTORIO DE JURISPRUDENCIA DEL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE
DERECHOS HuMANOs. BORRADOR PREUMINAR. JURISPRUDENCIA CONTENCIOSA DE 1A
CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 1980-1995 (1997).
219. See M.E. VENTURA ROBLES E AL., SISTEMATzACION DE LA JURISPRUDENCIA
CONTENcIOSA DE LA CORTE INfERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, 1981-1991
(1996).
220. For information on the promotion of related U.N. law and U.N.
programs in the field of criminal justice, see, e.g., United Nations Standards and
Norms in Crime Preventionand CriminalJustice,U.N. ESCOR, 45th plen. mtg., Res.
1996/16 (1996); Administrationof Juvenile Justice,U.N. ESCOR, 45th plen. mtg.,

Res. 1996/13 (1996); InternationalCooperationand Assistance in the Management
of the Criminal Justice System, U.N. ESCOR. 45th plen. mtg., Res. 1996/11
(1996).
221.

See C.F.P.C., art. 86.
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foreign law. 2 22 223Means of assistance include special Foreign
Service reports.
Analogous rules might be useful regarding the existence,
sense, force, and scope of rules of international law other than
treaties in force in Mexico. Analogous rules might be equally
useful to show how foreign courts, multilateral organs, or
international tribunals have applied and interpreted the treaty
before the court. Thomas Buergenthal states one critical angle of
the issue in the following terms:
Today it is much more likely than in the past for the decisions of
national courts to be quite regularly subject to the scrutiny of
international tribunals. And while it is true that these tribunals do
not ordinarily have jurisdiction to set aside or annul the decisions
of national courts, they may result in a finding that the national
courts erred in their interpretation of the state's international
obligations and that, therefore, the state must find a way to rectify
Decisions of international tribunals receive
the situation.
increasing

public attention,

moreover,

particularly

in cases

involving human rights issues. The national legal and political
establishment (Judges, lawyers, legislators and officials of the
executive branch) are thus becoming more sensitized to the notion
that national law and national courts no longer have the last word
in determining various issues arising in domestic litigation. With

this realization comes the recognition (sooner in some countries
than others) that lawyers and judges need to take decisions of

international tribunals into account in the domestic adjudicative
processes.224

Notwithstanding this suggestion, the Judicial branch is not and
should not be bound to necessarily take any executive organ's
views or reports on such sources as its own. The Constitution
gives final authority to the federal judiciary in this regard. Nor,
unlike cases involving foreign law, are Mexican courts bound to
apply treaties and international law as foreign tribunals or
international bodies would. These bodies and tribunals may
provide authoritative interpretations of treaties as a matter of
to interpret
international law; however, they are not authorized
22 5
treaties within the framework of domestic law.

Functional as it is to provide the courts with such
information, the interpretation of international norms as a matter

of Mexican law falls within the exclusive expertise and domain of
national courts.

222.
223.

In

Mexico,

rules

on the gathering

and

See id.
See id.

224. BUERGENTHAL, supranote 65, at 2.
225. See, e.g., Certain Attributes of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (arts. 41, 42, 46, 47, 50 and 51 of the American Convention on

Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-13/93, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 13 (Ser. A), 1 57(1)
(July 15, 1993).
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consideration of such sources as persuasive evidence seem more

likely to gain gradual acceptance and, therefore, are more
adequate to assist the courts.
C. Codification

Like the constitutional principles governing the President's
foreign policy, the framing of different Mexican statutes closely
follows international law. In applying these statutes, Mexican
courts need not determine to which rules open references to

"international law" would allude.

For judicial purposes, the

statute parallels or gives meaningful domestic content to
international norms and standards, thus preventing the problems
of determination and proof.
The LPTI follows this approach. 226 So do, to a different
extent, the Federal Code of Civil Procedure's "International
228
Procedural Cooperation" Chapter 22 7 and the Extradition Act,
229
deferring to pertinent treaties and conventions where possible.

226. Article 1 of the LPTI proscribes individuals and private or public
corporations "within national territory, whose acts take place or wholly or partially
produce effects in that territory, or those subject to Mexican laws, [from
performing] acts affecting trade or investment, when such acts result of the
extraterritorial effects of foreign laws." Ley de Proteccl6n al Comercio y la
Inversion, art. 1.
By foreign laws with extraterritorial effects, Article 2 of the LPrI refers to those
with any of the following purposes: (a) "to impose an economic blockade or even
limit investment toward a country to provoke the change of Its form of
government"; (b) "to allow claims of payment to private parties because of
expropriations performed in the country to which the blockade Is applied"; and (c)
"to restrict the entrance into the country enacting the law as one mean to achieve
the preceding objectives." Id art. 2.
Compare, e.g., wfth OAS Charter, OEA/Ser.A/2, 1-F O.A.S.T.S., amended by
the Protocols of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, and by the Protocol of Cartagena de
Indias, Dec. 5, 1985, art. 15 (-The jurisdiction of States within the limits of their
national territory is exercised equally over all the inhabitants"), and . art, 19
("No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or
political character In order to force the sovereign will of another State and obtain
from it advantages of any kind"), and Id. art. 35 (l-ansnational enterprises and
foreign private investment shall be subject to the legislation of the host countries
and to the jurisdiction of their competent courts and to the international treaties
and agreements to which said countries are parties."); see also Opinion of the
Inter-American Juridical Committee on Resolution AG/Doc.3375/96, Freedom of
Trade in the Hemisphere, OEA/Ser.G, CP/doc.2803/96 (Aug. 27, 1996)
[hereinafter Opinion of the Inter-American Juridical Committee on Freedom of
Trade in the Hemisphere]; OEA/Ser.G, CP/doc. 2859/97 at 39, 45 (Feb. 13,
1997) (concluding in "significant areas ... the bases and potential application of
the [Helms-Burton Act] are not in conformity with international law").
227. See C.F.P.C., arts. 543-77. Compare, e.g., I., art. 551 ("[International]
letters rogatory may be transmitted to the requested organ by the interested
parties, by judicial channel, through consular officials or diplomatic agents, or by
the competent authority of the requested or requesting State, as the case may
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These statutes were specifically conceived to operate in
harmony with International standards and undertakings,
providing substantial legislative guidance to the courts.
Eventually, the experience gained through their frameworks could
provide a useful background for a uniform code or manual on
procedural
rules governing the judicial
application
of
international law.

VII. THE EDUCATION OF MEXICAN JUDGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

The establishment of Councils of the Federal Bench, the
purpose of which includes developing the judicial profession, is
one basic ingredient of Mexico's administration of justice
reform. 2 30 One branch of the Council of the Federal Bench is an
institute required to instruct and update judges in matters related

be"), and id. art. 552 ("foreign letters rogatory transmitted through official
channels shall not require legalization."), with Inter-American Convention on
Letters Rogatory, supra note 61, art. 4 (essentially same text as Article 551), and
id. art. 6 ("Whenever letters rogatory are transmitted through consular or
diplomatic channels or through the Central Authority, legalization shall not be
required").
228. See Ley de Extradici6n, arts. 8-14. Compare, e.g., Ed., art. 10, § V
(requiring, for extradition purposes, assurances of the requesting State "that, if
the crime imputed to the requested person is punishable in its legislation with
capital punishment or any of the punishments constitutional article 22 refers to
['mutilation, marking, flagellations. beatings, torture of any kind ... and any
other unusual and extreme punishments'], only prison shall be imposed"), wth
Inter-American Convention on Extradition, Feb. 25, 1981, 60 O.A.S.T.S., art. 9
(requiring the same assurances under the same circumstances, adding the
possibility of assurances that, should capital punishment be imposed, it will not
be executed), and United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.Mex., T.IAS. No. 9656, art. 8 (requiring the same assurances regarding the
imposition or execution of capital punishment). For a discussion of capital
punishment, extradition and international human rights law, see also Soering v.
United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct H.R (ser. A) (1989).
229. See, e.g., C.F.P.C., art. 543 (general rules): id. art. 549 (international
letters rogatory); id. art. 560 (gathering of evidence abroad by consular or
diplomatic agents); Ley de Extradicidn, art. 3 (extraditions requested by the
Mexican government); id. arL 12 (preference to extraditions requested to Mexico
under international treaties, in case of simultaneous requests); Ed. art. 25
(admissibility of defenses on treaty-based grounds).
230. See MEm CoNsr. arts. 100, amended by D.O,, Dec. 31, 1994; d
§ 122(A), Base Cuarta§ II, amended by D.O., Aug. 22, 1996: Ley Orgdnica del
Poder Judicial arts. 68-84; Acuerdo Nilmero 1/1995 del Pleno del Consejo de la
Judicatura Federal, D.O., Feb. 20, 1995. For comparative background on this
subject, see generally HECTOR Fix-ZAmuDIo, Los PROBLEMAS CONTEMPORANEOS DEL
PODER JUDICIAL 30-40

(1986).
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to their functions. 2 3 ' Beneficiaries also include representatives of
23 2
the different levels of the bench and public counsel.
Naturally, the Councils of the Federal Bench present
exceptional opportunities for judge-oriented international law
programs. In this and other regards, the Institute of the Federal
Bench is available to assist interested local judiciaries and may
23 3
seek the support of Mexican universities.

A parallel development is the unprecedented International
attention to national judicial systems and the domestic
administration of justice. One regional commitment is advancing

the equal and effective access to justice. This commitment was
reflected in the First Summit of the Americas held in Miami in

1994.234 Today nearly every OAS organ has either mandates,
services, or suggestions in respect to the administration of justice
2 35
and related subjects.
National instructors represent one ideal way for educating
the officers of interested organizations about different legal and
judicial systems. Similarly, the instruction and updating of
national judges in international law are areas of possible
convergence, with due respect for judicial independence and nonintervention.
Just as states are sovereign to organize their courts, it is
exclusively for each Council of the Federal Bench to develop its

231. See Ley Orgd.nica del Poder Judicial, arts. 92-7.
232. See id., arts. 90 & 95.
233. See id., art. 92.
234. See Summit of the Americas:Declarationof Principlesand Planof Action,
Dec. 11, 1994, 34 l.L.M. 808 (1995).
235. See Enhancement of the Administrationof Justce in the Americas, supra
note 216; Supportfor the Administrationof Justice in the Americas, supra note 217
(promotional activities with participation of the General Secretariat, Permanent
Council, Inter-American Juridical Committee); Improvement of the Administration
of Justi.ce in the Americas, Protectionand Guaranteesfor Judges andLawyers in the
Exercise of their Fintfons, CJI/RES.I.19/94 (Aug. 25, 1994) (Inter-American
Juridical Committee's recommendations to the Permanent Council about
dissemination of U.N. Principles ofjudicial independence and problems that could
threaten it); GeneralPolicy Frameworkand Priorities:Partnershipfor Development,
AG/RES. 1. OAS GAOR (XX-E/94) § llI.b (Feb. 18, 1994) (General Assembly's
determination of priorities of the new Inter-American Council for Integral
Development, including "strengthening of public and Judicial administration").
See also American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 73, art. 41, e
(Inter-American Human Rights Commission's advisory services); U art. 64 (InterAmerican Human Rights Court's consultative services); A New Vision of the OAS,
Working Paper of the General Secretariatfor the Permanent Council 14 (1995)
(Secretary General's suggestion of "advisory services for revamping Judicial and
legal systems to improve the effectiveness of existing institutions of justice,
depending on the interests of the individual States"); Office of the OAS Secretary
General, The Law in a New Inter-American Order, OEA/Ser.G, CP/doc.2744/96, §§
3.1. 3.6, 4.1-2 (2d ed. 1996) (related Secretary General's suggestions).
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instructional programs according to its own priorities. Interested
Councils are nonetheless free to request, through appropriate

channels, such support as they deem appropriate. For example,
inter-American materials of interest for national judicial programs
include:
* Inter-American conventions on private international law,
extradition, corruption, judicial assistance, and execution of penal
236
sentences abroad:
e Inter-American human rights instruments, reports, judgements,
237
and opinions;
* Inter-American documents on judicial independence and
protection and guarantees for judges and lawyers in the exercise of
their functions;2 38 and
* Inter-American reports and opinions on free trade, coercive
23 9
measures, and commercial dispute-settlement.

236. See, e.g., Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, OAS GOAR,
Mar. 29, 1996, OEA/Ser.K/XXXIV.1, CICOR/doc.14/96 rev.2; Inter-American
Convention for the Execution of Penal Sentences Abroad, OAS GAOR, June 9,
1993, AG/RES. 1205 (XXII-0/93); Additional Protocol to the Inter-American
Convention on Letters Rogatory, May 8, 1979, O.A.S.T.S. 56, D.O., Apr. 28, 1983;
Inter-American Convention on Extradition, supranote 228; Additional Protocol to
the Inter-American Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, supra note
127; Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, supra note 74,
arts. 11-15 (extradition norms); Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory,
supranote 61; Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International
Contracts, supra note 58; Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration, supra note 39; Inter-American Convention on
Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards, supranote 39.
For an official catalog of OAS-sponsored treaties, see, e.g., 9 O.A.S.T.S. Rev.
1993, supra note 127.
237. See, e.g., BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAumG TO HUMAN RIGHTS INTHE INTERAMERICAN SYSTEM, OEA/Ser.L/V/ll.92, doe. 31 rev. 3 [Updated to May 19961;
1968 INTER. AM. Y.B. HUM. Rrs.; 1969-70 INTER. AM. Y.B. HuM. Rrs.; 1985 INTER.

AM. Y.B. HUM. RrS.; 1992 ITER. AM. Y.B. HUM. Rrs.; RoBLEs Er AL., supra note

219.
238. See, e.g., J.T. Fried, Report on Improvement of the Administration of
Justice in the Americas: Protection and Guaranteesfor Judges and Lawyers in the
Exercse of their Functions, annex to CJI/RES.Il.19/94; Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
Measures Necessary to Enhance the Autonomy, Independence and Integrity of the
Members of the Judicial Branch, 1992 INTER-AM. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 990, reprintedin
CJI RES.II. 19/94, id. at 105; see also Basic Principles on the Independence of the
Judiciary, adopted by the Seventh U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and
the Treatment of Offenders, Milan, Aug.-Sep. 1985, reprintedin CJI RES.lI.19/94,
id, at 95.
239. See, e.g., "Juridical Dimension of Integration and International Trade,"
CJI/RES.I-1/95 (Mar. 15, 1995), OEA/Ser.G, CP/doc.2711/96 (Feb. 27, 1996), at

15-17; J.L. Siquelros, La Soluci6n de Controversiasen el Marco del TIVLC o NAFTA,
CJI/SO.I/doc.2/94 (Dec. 21, 1994); J.L. Siquelros, Rgimen de Solucidn de

Controversias en la Asoclacin Latinoamerlcana de Integrac6n (ALADI),
CJI/SO.Il/doc.21/94 (Aug. 2, 1994); Opinion of the Inter-American Juridical
Committee on Freedom of Trade in the Hemisphere, supranote 226; Dlctamen del

Comltd JuridicoInteramericanosobre "MedidasCoercitvas de CardcterEconLmico,"
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Moreover, different court systems could benefit from treaty
series selected according to the specific functions of the court
systems. Family judges have an interest in treaties on children's
rights, conflicts of adoption laws, traffic of minors, alimony, and
violence against women. 240 Double imposition agreements relate
to the functions of taxation tribunals, 24 1 as do the International
242
Labor Organization conventions to those of labor tribunals.
Depending on the requirements of each interested court system,
another area suitable for national or international cooperation is
selecting and making accessible specific subject-matter sources
for judges.
It is through national law that international law attains
concrete judicial meaning.
Instructional cooperation seems
equally essential regarding comparative experiences on the
judicial consideration of international law.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Mexico's contributions to contemporary international law
include, to recall two paramount examples, the prompt and
effective remedy that human rights instruments gleaned from the
Mexican writ of amparO-4 3 and Mexico's support of the first

CJI/RES.I-04/1987, reprinted In CoMrrt JURfDCO INTERAMEPiCAo,

INFoRMES Y
RECOMENDACIoNEs 1987, Vol. XIX at 6 (1988).
240. See, e.g., Inter-American Convention on Prevention, Punishment and
Eradication of Violence Against Women, 33 I.L.M. 1534 (1994); Convention on the
Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, U.N. Doc. A/44/25, reprinted In BASIC
DocUMENmS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supranote 86, at 182; Inter-American Convention
on Support Obligations, July 15, 1989, 71 O.A.S.T.S.; Additional Protocol to the
American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Nov. 14, 1988, art. 16, 28 I.L.M. 156 (1989) (-Rights of
Children"); Convention on International Traffc in Minors. supra note 128; InterAmerican Convention on Conflict of Laws Concerning the Adoption of Minors,
supra note 59.
241. See, e.g., Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Nov. 7,
1992, Mex.-Swed., D.O., Feb. 10, 1993; Agreement for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation, Nov. 7, 1991, Mex.-Fr., D.O., Mar. 16, 1993; Agreement for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation on the Operation of Vessels, Oct. 18, 1984, Mex.Neth., 1434 U.N.T.S. 24308, D.O., Aug. 21, 1986.
242. For reprints of selected International Labor Organization Instruments,
see, e.g., BASIC DocuMENrS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 86, at 243-316.
243. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 73, art. 25
("Judicial protection"); American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,
adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogota, 1948,
OEA/Ser.L.V/I.92, doe. 31, rev. 3, art. XVIII (May 3, 1996) ("Right to a fair
trial"); Germdn Fernandez del Castillo, La Declaract6nAmericana de Dereclws y
Deberes del Hombre, in MInxico EN iA IX CoNFERENciA INTERNACIONAL AMERICANA
133, 149-50 (1948); Conferencia Especiallzada Interamericana sobre Derechos
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More

importantly, in Mexico the struggle for international peaceinseparable from justice, respect for international obligations, and
24 6
the rule of law2 4 5-enjoys constitutional rank.
If used to its full advantage, current Mexican law provides
plentiful means for making international undertakings effective
before domestic courts and tribunals of justice.
The
harmonization between national and international law will surely
continue, consistent with Mexico's foreign policy tradition and
with its administration of justice reform.
Continuing programs to increase awareness about the
domestic incorporation and uses of international law should
include not only judges and judicial officers, but also district
attorneys, legislators, and the Mexican bar. The role of state
courts, interpretive standards, and the integration of
constitutional and treaty-based rights are suitable for progressive

refinements.

The same is true for the standing to raise, and

provide evidence of, international law claims before Mexican
courts.
National systems that do not expressly accord constitutional
rank at least to selected international instruments now run
behind in comparative incorporation trends.2 4 7 As far as granting
treaties the same status as federal laws, it is essential not to lose
sight of one original purpose of constitutional supremacy: to
ensure domestic compliance with international undertakings
within the limits of fundamental rights, the rule of law, and
national public policy. Contemporary international law, namely
international human rights law, incrementally fosters these same

values.
Long-standing case law shows that, unless manifest
transgressions of the constitutional order appear, Mexican courts
and tribunals are able to carry out international treaties and that

Humanos, San Jose, Costa Rica 7-22 de Noviembre de 1969, Actas y
Documentos, OEA/Ser.K/XVI/1.2, at 261-63 (1978).
244. See Organismo para la Proscripci6n de las Armas Nucleares en la
Amdrica Latina y el Caribe, El Tratadode Tatelolco (1967-1987)19 (1987).

245.

See U.N. CHA=rR preamble; Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d mtg., GA. Res. 217.
246. See MEx. CONSr. art. 89, § X; supratext accompanying notes 7-9.
247. See Thomas Buergenthal, Modem Constitutions and Human Rights
Treaties, in ESSAYS INHONOR OF LOUIS HENKIN 2 (1997); accord Fix-Zamudio, supra

note 112; Carlos M. Ayala Corao, La Jerarqula de los Tratados de Derechos
Humnos, in THE INTER-AMERIcAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF
HuMAN RIGHTs 14 (Seminar, Dec. 2-4. 1996).
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Mexican judges do not confront a "non-self-executing" policy
deterring the direct application of treaties in force in the land. 2 48
These facts, though, do not obscure the advantages of
making express the implied constitutional status of treaties
advancing human rights and fundamental freedoms: progressive
judicial protection, more juridical certainty, and the prevention of
constitutional and international disputes. Another vital result
would consist of the reaffirmation that minimum rights are
subject to successive expansion, but not to regression or
withdrawal.
Because the American Human Rights Convention and the
U.N. covenants establish international jurisdictions, their integral
constitutionalization could involve complex judicial and political
problems. 2 4 9 With few exceptions, similar obstacles do not
surface regarding the possible constitutionalization of the

Convention's and the covenants' parts on rights and basic State
25 0

obligations.
The American and Universal Declarations on the subject do
not establish international mechanisms and set forth in equal
plane first- and second-generation rights.25 1
Lacking the
specificity of treaties, yet endowed with an evolving normative
content, they are less prone to conflict with the domestic order,
but suitable to gradually influence it. 25 2
To command
constitutional interpretation in their light could indirectly achieve

248. On the constitutionality of U.S. RUDs with such purposes, see
Buergenthal, supra note 247, at 11-14.
249. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 73, pt. II
("Means of Protection") ch. VII (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights); L
ch. VIII (Inter-American Court of Human Rights); International Covenant on Civil

and Political Rights, supra note 86, pt. IV (Human Rights Committee); see also
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 2st Sess., 1496th mtg. (1966). Mexico has not yet
recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Human Rights
Court, and is not yet party to the U.N. Optional Protocol. See supranote 38.
250.

See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 73, pt. I

("State Obligations and Rights Protected"); International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, supra note 86, pts. I-I; International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR. 21st Sess., 1496th mtg.
(1966). For a discussion of whether Mexican REDs to these instruments should
be withdrawn because of supervening or other circumstances, see RODRIGUEZ Y
RODRiGUEZ, supranote 163, at 54-81.

251.

See American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man, arts. I-XXVIII;

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 245.
252. On the normative status of these instruments, see, e.g.. Thomas
Buergenthal, La Relactin Conceptuwl y Normativa Entre la DeclaracidnAmericana y
la Convenct6n Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, 111 REVISTA IIDH 114 (1989);
PEDRO NIKEEN, LA PROTECCION INTERNACIONAL DE Los DERECHOS HuMANOs:
DESARROLLO PROGRESrvO 284-308 (1987).

Su

INTERNATIONAL LAWIN MEXICAN COURTS

1997]

1085

analogous results as achieved
by granting constitutional rank to
2 53
human rights treaties.
Emerging case law strongly suggests that the Mexican
judiciary might be receptive to this interpretive approach. In a
landmark 1997 opinion, the Supreme Court of Mexico affirmed

that a state law proscribing more than one labor union in each
local govemmental agency violates the Constitution. 254 Although
the Supreme Court relied on ILO Convention 87, it did not

directly apply the principle of the supremacy of treaties over state
laws. 25 5 Instead, the Court invoked the Convention as evidence
that the spirit underlying [Alrticle 123 ... has been to proclaim the
freedom of labor association in a fully universal sense, grounded in

the individual association right of each worker and recognizing a
collective right once the union gets existence and reality of its own,
principle that . . . is respected in the aforementioned
Convention.

256

In consonance with the ILO Convention, the Supreme Court
found that the constitutional freedom of labor association
encompasses: "1) [a] positive aspect, which leads to the
attribution of the worker to join a union that has been already
established or to establish new unions; 2) [a] negative aspect,
which implies the possibility of not joining any union at all[; and]
257
3) [t]he liberty to secede or to withdraw from the association."
By using the Convention as an interpretive aid, the Court treated
it as enjoying constitutional rank without expressly declaring so.
In any event, supreme normative hierarchy does not
necessarily entail exclusive, centralized federal jurisdiction over
every matter that becomes the subject of treaties.
Without
prejudice to the executive, legislative, or judicial powers of the
national government, treaties on different subject-matters
increasingly entail, on the contrary, positive measures within
each constituent unit.
Far from having disruptive effects,
interpretive provisions as described above could invigorate the

253.
254.

See SPAN. CoNsr. art. 10(2); PORT. CoNsr. art. 16(2).
See "Sindicacidn Unica. El Artculo 76 de la Ley para los Servidores

Pdiblicos del Estado de Jalisco y sus Municipios, Viola la Libertad Sindical
Consagrada en el Artfculo 123 Constitucional, Apartado 'B,' Fracci6n X," 5 S.J.F.
117-18 (9a dpoca 1997).
255.
See Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize

Convention, July 9, 1948, D.O., Oct. 10, 1950; Amparo en Revisfon 337/94,
Sindicato de Trabajadores del Personal Acaddmico de la Universidad de
Guadalajara, 21 Mayo 1996, 5 S.J.F. 145-48 (9a dpoca 1997).
256. See IdLat 147-48; MEx. CoNST. art. 123, § B(X) ("[Public] workers shall

have the right of association for the defense of their common interests").
257.

See Tesis 1/1997, supra note 254; Amparo en Revisfon 337/94, supra

note 255, at 148; Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize
Convention, supranote 255, art. 2.
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judicial consideration of international undertakings throughout
the Republic, in harmony with the Mexican federal system.

